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ABSTRACT
The United States and Turkey made an important alliance during the early Cold 
War and their alliance had an important role in the course of the Cold War. By the end 
of World War II, the United States felt the need to contain the Communist expansion led 
by the Soviet Union since it posed a threat to the American economic and security 
interests. On the other hand, the Soviet Union threatened Turkey’s territorial integrity 
denouncing the Turkish-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, dated November 17,1925. Turkey 
also needed economic aid to overcome its serious economic problems that increased by 
the end of the war. In the face of the common threat, Turkey and the United States 
formed an alliance, which would continue throughout the Cold War and has stretched 
until today. The 1950s has often been referred as the “golden age” of American-Turkish 
relations, however, it witnessed some disagreements and problems between the two 
countries, which damaged their relationship to some extent and formed the basis of their 
greater problems in the period after 1960.
This is a chronological study, which aims to illuminate the history of American- 
Turkish relations between 1945-1960, using U.S. government documents, journal 
articles, memoirs and secondary sources when necessary. The material is organized 
chronologically into three parts: the early American-Turkish relations by the end of 
World War II; the period between the Truman Doctrine and Turkey’s entry into NATO; 
and finally the American-Turkish relations during the Eisenhower Presidency.
Ill
ÖZET
Amerika Birleşik Devletleri ve Türkiye Soğuk Savaş’ın en güçlü ittifaklanndan 
birini yapmış ve bu ittifakla Soğuk Savaş’m seyrinde önemli bir rol oynamışlardır. 
1945’de İkinci Dünya Savaşının bitişiyle ABD ekonomik ve güvenlik çıkarlanna tehdit 
oluşturan Sovyet genişlemesini kontrol altına alma ihtiyacını hissetmiştir. Diğer taraftan 
Türkiye’nin toprak bütünlüğü, 17 Kasım 1925 tarihli “Türk-Sovyet Dostluk 
Anlaşmasf’m fesheden SSCB tarafından tehdit edilmekteydi ve Türkiye E. Dünya 
Savaşı sonrası artan ekonomik problemlerle başedebilmek için dış yardıma ihtiyaç 
duyuyordu. Bunun sonucunda Türkiye ve ABD ortak düşmana karşı Soğuk Savaş 
boyunca sürecek olan ve bugüne değin uzanan bir ittifak yapmışlardır. Her ne kadar 
1950’ler genelde Türk-Amerikan ilişkilerinin “altın çağ”ı olarak anılsa da, bu dönem 
aynı zamanda iki ülkenin ilişkilerini belli ölçüde yaralayan ve 1960 sonrası dönemdeki 
daha büyük problemlerin temelini oluşturan anlaşmazlıklara ve problemlere sahne 
olmuştur.
Bu tez ABD dokümanlan, akademik makaleler, hatıratlar ve kitaplardan 
yararlanarak 1945-1960 dönemi Türk-Amerikan ilişkileri tarihine katkı sağlamayı 
amaçlayan bir kronolojik çalışmadır. Konu kronolojik olarak üç bölüm halinde organize 
edilmiştir: II. Dünya Savaşı’nm hemen ertesindeki Türk-Amerikan ilişkileri; Truman 
Doktrini ve Türkiye’nin NATO’ya girişi arasındaki ilişkiler; ve son olarak da 
Eisenhower’ın Başkanlığı dönemindeki Türk-Amerikan ilişkileri.
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INTRODUCTION
Greece and Turkey share the attachment of the present NATO members to democratic 
principles and to the principle of collective security. They will be important elements of strength in 
the NATO not only because of their strategic location on the southeast flank of General 
Eisenhower’s command but because of their inherent strength and their determination to maintain 
their independence and freedom. In turn they will benefit from the collective strength of the NATO, 
to which they contribute.
Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, January
1 5 ,1 9 5 2
By the end of World War II, the world balance changed dramatically in a 
way that the major power was no more Europe but the United States and the 
Soviet Union. In other words, the world was divided into two camps: the 
Communist bloc under the leadership of the Soviet Union and the non-Communist 
bloc led by the United States. Under such a polarization, both sides tried to defeat 
the other, and in doing so they searched for alliances with other states. The United 
States engaged in several alliances all over the world and one of the most crucial 
of these alliances was the American-Turkish alliance throughout the Cold War.
Given the absence of serious diplomatic breakdowns or crises between the 
two countries, historians have often characterized the 1950s as the “golden age” of 
American-Turkish relations, especially in comparison with the problematic 
relationship that would develop between them by the 1960s, such as the infamous 
“Johnson’s Letter” of 1964, and the 1970s. However, my research indicates that
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the roots of the problems between the U.S. and Turkey can be located in the so- 
called “golden age”.
Between 1945 and 1960, both countries often stated that their interests 
were identical and they were allies, who serve for the same purpose. However 
they faced some problems and disagreements on many issues such as the status of 
the Turkish Straits by the end of WWII, or the questions like Turkey’s entry into 
NATO and the U.S.’ entry into Baghdad Pact. On each of those issues, the 
problem stemmed from the fact that the interests of the two countries were not 
very similar in actuality, and Turkey believed that it couldn’t get Ifom the 
American-Turkish alliance as it gave for it. As a result, the American-Turkish 
relations experienced a hard-time between 1945 and 1960 contrary to the general 
belief that it was the “golden era” of American-Turkish relations.
While the problems between the two countries were not obvious in the 
context of the Cold War, their existence when fully studied indicates they were 
not insignificant. This observation is all the more ironic given the public 
statements made by the two countries’ statesmen that their relations were very 
close and developed on the basis of mutual respect, cooperation, identical 
purposes, and even friendship. In fact, as this thesis will show, the 1950s, contrary 
to conventional wisdom, are more accurately seen as a “gilded age” of American- 
Turkish relations. That is, while on the surface there was so-called layer of gold, 
underneath, the substance was far less glittery.
Research for this thesis reveals that several scholars, American and 
Turkish, have an interest in the U.S. foreign relations with Turkey during the Cold 
War. The works of these scholars point out the fact that Turkey, with its highly
strategie location between Europe and Asia, played a profound role for the 
realization of American foreign policy objectives during the Cold War.
Among those scholars is George S. Harris. Harris, in his work. Troubled 
Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective, 1945-1971, 
demonstrated the significance in the post-war environment of the United States 
providing both economic and military aid to Turkey, although it was not very 
eager at first. According to Harris, Turkey’s entry into NATO created a profound 
happiness among Turks and they readily assumed that Turks and Americans were 
intrinsically alike and that Turkey could and should become a little America. The 
thesis seeks to show that the U.S. foreign policy objectives in the region were 
welcomed by the Turkish government and made it easier for the U.S. to realize its 
policy objectives in the region. However, it was not always an easy task to make 
the United States show its solid commitment to Turkey in various issues like 
having the American support in the Straits issue or Turkey’s entry into NATO. '
Ferenc Vali is also one of the scholars who studied the role of Turkey and 
the Turkish Straits in international affairs. He argued that the straits have always 
been one of the defining factors not only in Turkish-American relations but also in 
the whole Turkish foreign affairs throughout history. The traditional Soviet claims 
over the Turkish straits were repeated through the end of World War II but they 
were not welcomed by the Truman administration since it believed that the 
Turkish Straits were the keys to Communist Russia’s access to the open seas and 
it would threaten the West’s economic and security interests. Thus, the first reason 
for the American-Turkish rapprochement after the World War II was to prevent 
the Soviet Union from having bases on the Turkish Straits. ^
Oral Sander is another well-known scholar who specialized in 
foreign policy and American-Turkish relations. In his book, Turkish-American 
Relations 1947-1964, he looked at the subject from a broad perspective by 
comparing the Turkish and American approaches to various issues and with an 
emphasis on American interests in the Middle East region. Sander argued that the 
major determinants of the American foreign relations with Turkey were the 
strategic position of Turkey in the Middle East and the increased importance of 
the Middle East in the United States’ struggle against the Soviet Union. ^
Sander argued that the motive behind the Truman Doctrine was not the 
defense of Turkey against a Soviet threat but the security and future of Europe."* 
He stated that Turkey’s membership in NATO was vital because the United States 
wanted to expand its security measures in the region, needed bases in Turkey, and 
wanted to secure the free access to the Middle East oil.  ^ So the U.S. interest in 
Turkey was more pragmatic than principled. Moreover, Washington perceived 
Turkey as a country, which was both an ally of the West and close to the Middle 
East countries. In chapter two and chapter three, we’ll see that Turkey became a 
member of NATO, the Balkan and the Baghdad Pacts at the same time which 
correlate with the argument of Sander.
Melvyn P. Leffler’s article, “Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War; The 
United States, Turkey, and NATO, 1945-1952’’ published in The Journal of 
American History in 1985, offered valuable arguments about Washington’s 
decision-making process in the announcement of the Truman Doctrine and 
Turkey’s entry into NATO. He argued that the State Department and the military 
officials believed that the Soviet Union posed a threat to Turkey and the whole 
Mediterranean in the long-term and thus the United States sought to take
advantage of a favorable opportunity to enhance the strategic interests of the 
United States in the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean. Leffler also 
argued that the United States did take into account the possibility that Turkey 
would remain neutral if not attacked, while deciding on Turkey’s entry into 
NATO.^
Another important reference about American-Turkish relations was the 
work of George McGhee who served as the Ambassador of the United States in 
Ankara between January 1952 and May 1953, entitled U.S.-Turkey-NATO-Middle 
East. In his work, McGhee not only gives narratives about his own experiences 
with Turkey and Turkish officials during his ambassadorship between 1952 and 
1953, but he also describes the foreign policy attitudes of the United States and 
the diplomacy conducted between the two countries.
McGhee said that Turkey began to improve its relations with the Middle 
East by the encouragement of the United States and acted as a guide and mediator 
for Washington in its affairs with the Middle East.* He also noted that Turkey 
would be the cornerstone of the “Northern Tier” concept formulated by the 
Secretary of State Dulles for the Middle East defense against the Communist 
threat.^
The first chapter of the thesis will examine the developments between 
1945 and 1947. It analyzes the attitude of the United States towards Turkey 
between the Second World War and the Truman Doctrine, when Turkey was more 
passive in its foreign relations compared to the period after. We’ll see that, the 
major focus of the Truman Administration’s foreign policy in that period was the 
Turkish Straits. We’ll see that the United States didn’t give its support to Turkey, 
which faced the Soviet claims over the Straits in 1945, before it was assured of
Soviet expansionism in late 1946. The major argument of the first chapter is that 
this lack of commitment by the U.S. to the Turkish sovereignty and interests was 
the first serious breakdown of the “gilded-age” of the American-Turkish 
relations.
The second chapter, on the other hand, examines the developments 
between 1947 and 1952. It begins with an analysis of the American-Turkish 
relations Just after the announcement of the Truman Doctrine, and the expansion 
of the Marshall Plan to include Turkey. It continues with the outbreak of the war 
in Korea to which Turkey sent a significant number of troops, the changing nature 
of American foreign policy and Turkey’s entry into NATO. In this chapter, we’ll 
see that the period between 1949 and 1952 witnessed intense discussions between 
the advocates of Turkey’s entry into NATO and the ones who opposed. In this 
chapter, it will be argued that although Turkey’s entry into NATO in 1952 is 
widely accepted as the proof of American commitment to Turkey at the time 
being, American reluctance to include Turkey into the Pact for a long time led to 
the deterioration of American-Turkish relations and formed the basis of future 
problems between the two countries.
Finally, the third chapter focuses on American-Turkish relations during the 
Eisenhower and Menderes Administrations. It begins with Turkey’s entry into the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which was a turning point in American- 
Turkish relations. The chapter mainly deals with the diplomacy and relations 
between the two countries in maintaining peace, stability and unity in the Middle 
East region. The formation of the Balkan and Baghdad Pacts, the Suez Crisis, the 
coup in Iraq, the American intervention in Lebanon are examined from the 
perspective of American-Turkish relations. In this chapter, it will be argued that
the American unwillingness to be a solid part of the Middle East defense along 
with Turkey after 1953 and its unilateral attitude in Lebanese intervention 
damaged further the relations between the two countries, although they became 
close allies after Turkey’s entry into NATO.
The time frame of this thesis helps us to see the Turkish-American 
alliance in its continuity. According to the author, the period between 1945 and 
1960 was the most crucial period in understanding the American-Turkish alliance, 
not only throughout the history of the Cold War- but also today, because the 
foundations of that alliance were laid in that particular era and continued until 
today. The major motive behind choosing that subject was the belief that, 
understanding history provides an important perspective on understanding today.
The reader should be aware that not every detail concerning the subject is 
included in this study. The special emphasis was on the developments that are 
perceived as the most crucial in the light of the primary sources and recently 
published works of scholars who were specialized in American-Turkish relations. 
The sources to be utilized in this thesis are not only primary sources such as 
government archives and memoirs but also secondary sources and periodicals.
 ^ George S. Harris, Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective, 1945-1971. 
Washington D.C.: American Institute for Public Policy Research, 1972.
 ^ See Ferenc Vali, Turkish Straits and NATO, (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1972).
 ^ See Oral Sander, Tiirk-Amerikan İlişkileri (1947-1964), (Ankara: Sevinç, 1979)
Mbid., 11.
Ibid., 55-60.
 ^ Melvyn P. Leffler, “Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War: The United States, Turkey, and NATO, 
1945-1952”, The Journal of American History, Vol. 71, Issue 4 (1985)
George McGhee, ABD-Türkiye-NATO-Ortadoğu..., (Ankara: Bilgi, 1992)
 ^ Ibid., 164.
Mbid., 261.
Notes:
CHAPTER I
“One reason [for Turkey’s importance], of course, is its location and the issues 
that come with that geography-big issues; issues that have literally made or broken past 
administrations’ foreign policies: Russia; the Caucasus and Central Asia; Iran; 
Iraq;...Syria; Israel and the Arab world; Cyprus and the Aegean; the Balkans; the 
European Security and Defense Initiative (ESDI);...I would submit that no 
administration can achieve its objectives on any of these issues unless the Turks are on 
the same page.’’
Mark Parris, Former U.S. Ambassador to Turkey'
The Evolution of the American-Turkish Relations
The United States’ relations with Turkey go back to the Ottoman Empire. 
However, the American-Turkish relations before World War II were mainly composed 
of trade relations and missionary activities, so it’s beyond the scope and purpose of this 
thesis. Rather we will analyze the postwar period during which the American-Turkish 
relations entered into a whole new phase with the beginning of the Cold War when 
Turkey became one of the most important allies of the U.S. The major reason of their 
rapprochement by the end of WWU was the Turkish Straits. Turkey faced the Soviet 
claims over the Straits, which was a threat to Turkish sovereignty and interests, and 
searched American support to resist those claims. However, the United States didn’t 
give its support to Turkey until it was assured of Soviet expansionist aims and it was 
clear that the Soviet-American conformity was just a dream given the existing interests 
of both countries. Although Washington began to support Turkey after 1946, the 
relations between the two countries were damaged to some extent, after the lack of 
interest by the U.S. in 1945, when the Soviet claims posed an important threat to
Turkey, and it was the first disagreement of the gilded age of American-Turkish 
relations.
It has been a common effort by many historians of foreign policy to start with 
the Truman Doctrine when analyzing the evolution of American-Turkish relations. 
Although the Truman Doctrine, dated March 12,1947, was a turning point in American- 
Turkish relations, it was not the first effort by Washington showing American support 
to Turkey. The first support came in 1946 when the United States did no longer believe 
that they could work with Stalin. Turkey cautioned the United States, who was in favor 
of a revision of the Montreux Convention^, that the Convention was a multilateral treaty 
but what the Soviets asked lor was a bilateral revision. The United States, assured of 
Soviet expansionist aims and realizing that the bilateral revision of the Montreux 
Convention could jeopardize the Western security and economic interests, began to 
support Turkey by the second half of 1946 and its support continued with an increasing 
rate until the announcement of the Truman Doctrine. Thus, our first effort should be to 
analyze the American attitude towards Turkey and the developments until the Truman 
Doctrine in order to understand the relations between the two states after 1947.
The Turkish Straits have always played an important role in international affairs 
throughout the history and the first reason behind the American rapprochement with 
Turkey was the Straits. Ferenc Vali notes in his work The Turkish Straits and NATO 
that,“All the natural routes-land, sea, and air, from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean 
and Ifom the Balkans to the Persian Gulf- lead across Turkey and in most cases across 
the Straits area.” ^
Being aware of the strategic importance of the Straits, Russians had always had an 
interest in the Straits since the days of Peter the Great. The historical desire of Russia to 
gain control over the straits and the Black Sea region was strengthened by the racial
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doctrine of Slavism in the 19''’ century and survived under the Marxist ideology of the 
U.S.S.R.'' The interwai" period witnessed a more or less friendship and solidarity 
between the two neighbor states but it did not last long. The Soviet Union had sought 
guarantees from the West to have control over the Straits before the end of the war. It’s 
known that the British Prime Minister Churchill promised Stalin such access at the 
Tehran Conference in 1943 and again at Moscow in 1944.
In a secret memorandum prepared by G. M. Elsey, President Truman’s assistant 
of naval affairs, and dated June 1945, Elsey stated that Stalin had opened a discussion 
on the revision of the Montreux Convention when he and British Prime Minister 
Winston Churchill had met in Moscow in October 1944. Stalin had wanted the 
Convention to be modified to allow the free passage “at all times’’ of Russian warships 
and Churchill had agreed on it. Moreover, the British Prime Minister informed the U.S. 
President Roosevelt about Stalin’s views and said that he hadn’t been against this 
proposal because revision was necessary as Japan had been a signatory. ^
Now, we need to look at some of the memorandums and reports prepared mainly 
by the State Department of the U.S. in order to understand the approach of Washington 
concerning the future of the Straits. Although unknown by the Turkish government at 
that time, the U.S. government had been thinking about the Straits long before the 
Truman Doctrine, since Turkey straddled the economically and strategically important 
Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean. Consequently, the U.S. was against any major 
change in the status of the Straits since it could threaten the status quo and the American 
interests in the region. According to a memorandum prepared by the State Department 
in October 1944 for President Roosevelt, the government hoped that no question would 
be raised about Montreux because:
a)the Montreux Convention (signed on July 20, 1936; signatories: 
Belgium, France, Great Britain, Japan, Rumania, Turkey, USSR,
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Yugoslavia) has worked well, and the Soviet Government so declared to 
the Turks jointly with Great Britain on August, 10 1941. Non-use of the 
Straits as an avenue of supply to Russia during this war was due to Axis 
command of Rumania, Bulgaria, Greece, and the Aegean, not to the 
Montreux Convention.
a)Any major changes in the regime of the straits probably would violate 
Turkish sovereignty and affect adversely the strategic and political 
balance in the Balkans and the Near East. By and large Turkey has been a 
good custodian of the Straits. ^
Thus, the United States, before the end of war, did not want any “major changes” in the 
Montreux Convention such as giving bases to the Soviet Union in the Straits which 
could threaten Western interests in the long-run. However, it was in favor of a revision 
of the Convention, as we’ll see later in a memorandum by the State Department, in a 
way to allow the free passage of Russian warships from the Straits at all times which 
could threaten the Turkish interests.
Four months after that memorandum, on February 4, 1945, the Yalta Conference 
was held in Yalta, Crimea to discuss the postwar anangements. There, the United 
States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union signed a protocol, but many issues remained 
unsolved. There was no debate on the Straits during the Conference and it was agreed to 
discuss the changes in the Convention at the next meeting of the Foreign Secretaries to 
be held in London. ^
On March 19, 1945, the Soviet Union denounced the Turkish-Soviet Treaty of 
Friendship dated November 17, 1925. Moreover, in June, they wanted the Kars and 
Ardahan districts of East Anatolia as well as a military base on the Straits. Thus, the 
Soviet aim was to have some major changes in the Montreux Convention, which would 
allow it to have a basis in the Dardanelles and pass its warships in times of peace and 
war. According to Turkey, those requests were simply jeopardizing the national security 
of the country. Consequently, Turkey felt a great anxiety and it turned towards the U.S. 
for help. The U.S. was seen as a remedy for both the severe economic difficulties that
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started by the end of the war and the Soviet threat that became more and more 
aggressive in tone through the end of the war. However, as mentioned before, the U.S. 
and Britain did not give official support to Turkey against the Soviet pressures on the 
Straits until the second half of 1946.
When we look at the documents prepared between June-July 1945 by various
government bureaus of the U.S. before the Potsdam Conference, we can easily see that
the U.S., like Great Britain, was not against the passage of warships through the Straits
at all times. Moreover, they didn’t express any opinion about the territorial claims. On
the other hand, the U.S. opposed the Soviet Union having bases in the Straits. In a Top
Secret “Memorandum Regarding the Montreux Convention”, it was stated that:
During time of war, regardless of whether one or more of the Black Sea 
powers is involved, the war vessels of the Black Sea riparian powers 
shall have free ingress and egress through the Straits in the absence of 
contrary directions of the United Nations Organization.
No power other than Turkey shall be granted the right to have a 
fortification on the Dardanelles or to maintain any basis in the
g
Dardanelles without the free consent of Turkey.
Thus, we can say that the U.S. was cautious in its attitude towards Turkey and 
the Straits. Although Washington was not against the free passage of warships through 
the Straits, it was determined not to allow Russians to have bases in the Turkish straits. 
Moreover, it was stated in the same document that the U.S. did not want the Dardanelles 
to become an “area of international dispute and a potential threat to world peace”  ^In a 
briefing document prepared by the State Department on July 29,1945, it was also 
mentioned that:
If the I.S.O.(International Security Organization) should fail (and 
the Turks are inclined to be pessimistic) they anticipate a difficult period 
of pressure politics from both East and West. In this event it would seem 
preferable from the point of view of this government’s interest in world 
peace for Turkey either to have special alliances in both directions or no 
alliances at all..
This Government should make it abundantly clear at the meeting of 
the Heads of Governments that it cannot remain silent if any country
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takes steps which threaten the independence and integrity of Turkey in 
isolation of the principles of the I.S.O.
Between July 17-August 2 1945, the Potsdam Conference was held. It witnessed 
intense discussions about the Straits among Truman, Stalin and Churchill. Marshall 
Stalin said that the Montreux Convention was inimical and gave Turkey the right to 
block the Straits whenever it wanted. He complained that “a small state supported by 
Great Britain held a great state by the throat and gave it no outlet.” ' ' President Truman, 
on the other hand, said that the question of the territorial concessions was a dispute 
between Turkey and Russia, and they had to settle it themselves but the question of the 
Black Sea Straits concerned the US. and the rest of the world as it concerned the Soviet 
Union. He believed that the Straits “should be a freeway open to the whole world and 
should be guaranteed by all of (them)”'“ With such a point of view. President Truman 
cleverly advocated that all inland waterways bounded by more than two states be placed 
under international control and thus he blocked effort of the Soviet Union to have 
control over the Straits. The Straits question did not appear in the final document of the 
Potsdam Conference because Stalin wanted so. Rather, it was mentioned that the 
matters should be the subject of direct conversations between each of the three 
governments and the Turkish government. On his return from the Conference, 
Truman summed up the position he had taken at Potsdam, as follows:
One of the persistent causes of wais in Europe in the last two 
centuries has been the selfish control of the waterways in Europe. I mean 
the Danube, the Black Sea Straits, the Rhine, the Kiel Canal, and all the 
inland waterways of Europe which border on two or more states.
The United States proposed at Berlin that there, be free and 
unrestricted navigation of these inland waterways. We think this is 
important the future peace and security of the world. We proposed that 
regulations for such navigation be provided by international authorities.
The function of the agencies would be to develop the use of the 
waterways and assure equal treatment on them for all nations. 
Membership on the agencies would include the United States, Great 
Britain, the Soviet Union, and France, plus those states which border on
the waterways. 14
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Although not informed about the discussions at the Potsdam Conference, Ankara
was alarmed about the Conference due to its own information. It sent a note to
Washington on August 20, 1945 searching for U.S. guarantees about a solution, which
would not jeopardize Turkish security and sovereignty. The answer to the note from
Washington came on November 2. In the note given by the U.S. Ambassador Edwin C.
Wilson to Turkish Foreign Minister Hasan Saka, Wilson said that the American
Government had given careldl consideration to the Turkish government’s note and saw
it necessary to make revisions in the Montreux Convention. The United States called for
the opening of the Straits to the transit of the warships of the states bordering the Black
Sea at all t imes.Such a response increased the tensions in Turkey since it was against
the 18''' aricle of the Montreux Convention and could threaten Turkey’s interests in case
of a war of which Turkey was not a part.'^ Feridun Cemal Erkin, the Turkish Secretary
General, stated the three difficulties of the American proposals as:
IjThere was no indication as to how the Black Sea Powers were to 
decide whether warships of non-riparian states were to enter the Black 
Sea;
2) The Turks might find the entire Soviet possibly satellite fleets in the 
teiritorial waters of Istanbul at the same time; and
3) The effect of the American proposals would be to turn the Black Sea 
into a Soviet naval base “from which the Soviet Navy could make hit and 
run expeditions into the Mediteiranean without danger of pursuit.’^
By the year 1946, American-Turkish relations entered in a new phase and the 
U.S. began to back Turkey more as a result of the developments in the Middle East and 
the Eastern Mediteiranean region as well as the Soviet notes given to Turkey in the 
summer of 1946. From that time on, the U.S. would be interested not only in the Straits 
but also in the ten itorial integrity of Turkey, which Washington had disregarded at first. 
The reason for that increased interest could be summaiized as the American concern of 
Soviet expansionism due to the Iran Crisis, renewed civil war in Greece and the Soviet
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notes calling for bases on the Turkish Straits.'** In other words, Turkey’s geo-strategic 
significance became an invaluable asset for U.S. policy only when Washington was 
convinced of an expansionist Soviet power.
The Iran Crisis had an important effect on American foreign policy making and 
thus American-Turkish relations. Although the war had ended months ago, the Red 
Army hadn’t withdrawn from Northern Iran and, as claimed by scholar Fred Lawson, 
the Red Army prevented the Tehran government from suppressing separatist 
movements in Azerbaijan. The communist Tudeh Party proclaimed the Azerbaijan 
Republic in the Soviet controlled Iranian Azerbaijan on December 12,1945. It raised 
tensions between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and the Crisis over Iran continued until 
the spring of 1946. Lawson indicates that the revisionists and post-revisionists offer 
different explanations on the reasons for the Iran crisis. According to the revisionists, 
the American economic interests in Iran were so extensive that Washington could not 
stay out of Iran’s internal affairs. Post-revisionists, on the other hand, argue that 
American leaders were more heavily influenced by strategic considerations than 
economic ones during the crisis.^® Whatever was the motive of the U.S. in intervening 
in the Iran Crisis, it’s sure that the Truman administration perceived the Soviet activities 
as part of Soviet expansionism in the region, and a threat to U.S. interests. Truman 
states in his memoirs that “if Russians were to control Iran’s oil, either directly or 
indirectly, the raw material balance of the world would undergo a serious change and it
9 Iwould be a serious loss for the economy of the western world.’’ “
The Iran Crisis was related to the security of Turkey beeause Turkey was 
strategically located between the Persian Gulf and the Eastern Mediterranean. By the 
outbreak of the Iran crisis in 1946, Turkey began to be threatened by the Soviets from 
both east and west. There were rumors about troop concentrations in Bulgaria since
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1945 and the crisis over Iran was growing since January 1946. When the Iran Crisis was
at its peak, Truman stated, “Turkey’s position would be infinitely more difficult if
22Russia, or a Russian puppet state, were able to outflank her in the east.”
The developments in Iran had an important effect on the foreign policy 
formulations of Washington concerning Turkey and the whole Middle East. As early as 
January 1946, Truman said to the Secretary of State James Byrnes, “no doubt that 
Soviets intend to attack Turkey” and, “if they (were) not faced with an iron fist and 
strong language, another war (was) in the making.” Byrnes agreed, stating in 
February that the U.S. should follow a determined policy towards the Soviet Union and 
that they were ready to act to prevent an offensive by the Soviets. Therefore, the 
Truman Administration started to take the necessary steps to prevent the Soviet 
penetration in the region, which would threaten the security of not only Iran but also of 
Turkey and the whole Middle East.
Also, as mentioned before, the civil war in Greece, between the Soviet backed 
leftist groups and the pro-monarchy right wing, was another motive behind the changing 
U.S. foreign policy towards Turkey. Washington had always tended to see the security 
of Greece and Turkey as one: If Greece fell under Soviet control then Turkey would be 
the next, or vice versa. Also there was a strong Greek lobby in the U.S., which pressed 
the government to end the strife in Greece as soon as possible.
Before discussing the Soviet notes to Turkey, sent in the summer and autumn of 
1946, we have to mention a very important event that happened in the spring: the visit 
of the U.S.S. Missouri, the most powerful waiship in the U.S. Navy, where Japan signed 
its suiTender, to Istanbul on March 6, 1946. It was carrying the remains of the Turkish 
Ambassador Mehmet Munir Ertegun, who died in Washington on November 11, 1944 
and it anchored in the Bosphorus for four days before moving to Greece. Turkish
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people were so pleased with the visit of the ship that some shop-owners changed the 
name of their shops as “Missouri”.^  ^ Some accept, reasonably, that it was one of the 
most important signs of the United States’ commitment to Turkey. Barry M. Blechman 
and Stephan S. Kaplan interpret this event as another use of armed forces as a political 
instrument. Hence, this visit was more than a diplomatic mission. Blechman and Kaplan 
note that;
As a symbol of American support for Turkey vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, 
the visit of the Missouri was well received and deeply appreciated by the 
government of Turkey, the Turkish press, and presumably by the Turkish 
citizenry at large. The American ambassador stated that to the Turks the 
visit indicated that the ‘United States has now decided that its own 
interests in this area require it to oppose any effort by the USRR to 
destroy Turkey’s independence and integrity.
In the following months after the visit of V.S.S. Missouri and setting up 
Communist rule in Eastern Europe, the Soviet troops in Eastern and Southeastern 
Europe withdrew gradually. In the late summer of 1946, General Hoyt Vandenberg, 
director of the Central Intelligence Group, reassured President Truman that there were 
no unusual Soviet troop concentrations, troop movements or supply buildups. On top 
of the troop withdrawals from Europe, the Crisis over Iran eased after the Russian 
announcement in March 1946, that all Russian troops would be withdrawn from Iran at 
once. The U.S. support to Turkey by the visit of IJ.S.S. Missouri can be accepted as 
proof of an American interest in Turkey.
But while the Soviets backed off in Europe and Iran, they intensified pressure on 
Turkey and by the end of 1946, the United States was certain about an overall Soviet 
expansionism. One of the major reasons why Washington was assured about the Soviet 
expansionist aims was the Soviet note to Turkey, which were also transmitted to the 
U.S. and U.K., on August 7, 1946 calling for a new regime for the Dardanelles. The 
new regime would exclude all nations except the Black Sea powers and give the Soviet
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Union a base on the Straits. As an answer, the U.S. asserted that the Soviet Union had 
proposed a “new regime” rather than a “revision” of the Montreux Convention and 
stated that it was the view of the Americans that the regime of the Straits was a “matter 
of concern not only to the Black Sea powers but also to other powers, including the 
U.S.”
Just after the first Soviet note, the Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson warned 
Truman that the Soviets aimed to dominate Turkey first, and Greece, the Middle East 
oil, and India and China would be next. Truman agreed Acheson and stated that;
This was indeed an open bid to obtain control of Turkey. If 
Russian troops entered Turkey with the ostensible purpose of enforcing 
joint control of the Straits, it would only be a short time before these 
troops would be used for the control of all of Turkey. We had learned 
from the experience of the past two years that Soviet intervention 
inevitably meant Soviet occupation and control. To allow Russia to set 
up bases in the Dardanelles or to bring troops into Turkey, ostensibly for 
the defense of the Straits, would in the natural course of events, result in 
Greece and the whole Near and Middle East falling under Soviet 
control.” '^
It’s quite interesting that this was an early version of the so-called “domino 
theory” by Truman and Acheson as early as in 1945.^“ The second Soviet note came on 
September 24 explaining why the proposed changes for the Turkish Straits were 
necessary. It too was rejected by Washington for the same reasons before, and the U.S. 
began to put more emphasis on Turkey.
The developments in the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean 
accompanied by the Soviet demands over the Turkish Straits were the reasons behind 
the formation of the Truman Doctrine. The Truman administration could not let the 
Soviet Union gain control over the Straits, which, according to Truman, would help the 
Soviet Union obtain control of Turkey as a whole and would not be the end of Russian 
aims. In his memoirs, parallel to Acheson’s presumption. President Truman recalled 
that, “to allow Russia to set up basis in the Dardanelles or to bring up troops into
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Turkey, ostensibly for the defense of the straits, would, in the natural course of events, 
result in Greece, and the whole Near and Middle East falling under Soviet control.”^^  
According to President Truman, it was now imperative to give aid to Turkey and 
Greece.
Thus, the United States, which was not very concerned with Turkish interests in 
1945, made an important shift in its attitude after 1946 and began to give its full support 
to Turkey against the Soviet Union, realizing that this country would be an important 
element in realizing its foreign policy objectives in the region in the face of Soviet 
expansionist aims. However, the problems between the two countries were laid in that 
period due to the American attitude towards the security of Turkey at the very 
beginning.
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CHAPTER II
The period between 1947 and 1952 witnessed both satisfactions and 
disagreements in terms of American-Turkish relations. The announcement of the 
Truman Doctrine, the first important development of the period, created an immense 
happiness in Turkey, which began to perceive the United States as its major ally. 
However, two years later, the American-Turkish relations experienced a significant 
deterioration when the U.S. rejected the proposal of Turkey, which made a significant 
contribution to the Korean War, as a member of NATO, while including Italy in the 
Pact. It made the Turkish government to think that the United States didn’t care enough 
about Turkey, which tied its foreign policy almost entirely to the West in general, and to 
the United States in particular, and was declared as an important part of American 
strategy in the Eastern Mediteiranean and Middle East. It led to a significant 
deterioration in American-Turkish relations between 1949 and 1952, although both 
sides continuously expressed their deep interest to each other and Turkey finally entered 
into NATO.
On March 12, 1947, Truman made his famous speech before a joint session of 
the Congress, proclaiming what later would be called as the Truman Doctrine, and 
requested $400 million in aid for Greece and Turkey.' It was not a coincidence that 
Truman made his speech just after Britain sent notes to the United States on its 
withdrawal from Greece and Turkey and that it could no longer give financial and 
economic aid to Turkey and Greece after March 31,1947, since it had found itself under 
the necessity of reducing or liquidating its commitments in several parts of the world, 
including Greece and Turkey.^
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In his speech, Truman declared his rationale that “it (must) be the policy of 
the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by 
armed minorities or by outside pressures”  ^The President emphasized Greece more than 
Turkey and Greece received the largest portion of the economic aid because the civil 
war in Greece made the country very weak both economically and politically. However, 
it was always mentioned by Washington that the security of Greece and Turkey were 
highly interconnected and. in his speech, Truman wrote, “If Greece should fall under the 
control of an armed minority, the effect upon its neighbor, Turkey, would be immediate 
and serious.”'* Moreover, he mentioned in his memoirs that: “If Greece was lost, Turkey 
became an untenable outpost in a sea of Communism. Similarly, if Greece yielded to 
Soviet demands, the position of Turkey would be extremely endangered.” ^
According to Oral Sander, a well-known scholai· of Political Science and 
American-Turkish relations, the Doctrine had two aims: The first and the broad one was 
to contain the Soviet Union while the second one was to strengthen Greece and Turkey 
with economic and military aid to help to realize the first aim.  ^While agreed upon this 
argument to a great extent, many historians of American-Turkish relations have offered 
different explanations for the American motives to support Turkey with economic and 
military aid. Some argue that there was an imminent Soviet threat against the Turkish 
Straits and territory and the Soviet Union became more aggressive in tone after the 
Soviet notes. Therefore, it had to be confronted. Others argue that there was no 
imminent threat to Turkey but still it had to be supported because Turkey’s national 
security and sovereignty was vital for the security of Greece. A third and most 
reasonable argument, which does not necessarily conflict with the above arguments is 
the one by Melvyn Leffler. According to Leffler, Washington sought to take advantage 
of a favorable opportunity by the Truman Doctrine to further the strategic interests of
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the United States in the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean although they were 
not expecting an imminent Soviet attack to Turkey. ^
In order to be more precise about the real motives behind the Truman Doctrine 
we have to examine briefly the American foreign policy formulations that led to the 
Doctrine. Before the Soviet notes to Turkey, the U.S. strategic planners had begun to 
develop some policy formulations for the postwar era. As we have stated before, the 
Truman administration had lost the final traces of its optimism after the London Foreign 
Ministers’ Meeting, and the developments in 1946 had led the United States to become 
more interested in the Middle East and the East Mediterranean region which were vital 
for American strategic and security interests. Faced with the Iran crisis and the rapid 
deterioration of American-Soviet relations, the State Department pressed the military 
and strategic planners to define the importance of Turkey in the spring of 1946. As a 
result, the strategic planners argued that the importance of Turkey was paramount since 
it would “provide a cushion, absorbing the initial Soviet blow and deterring Soviet 
advances, while the United States prepared to undertake the counter-offensive 
particularly from the Cairo-Suez area.”* Egypt, then, appeared the best place to launch 
a retaliatory air attack against Soviet advances. The strategic and militaiy planners 
pressed the State Department that “every practical measure should be undertaken to 
permit the utilization of Turkey as a base for Allied operations in the event of war with 
the USSR.”  ^ Thus, there began a debate in the United States among various 
departments to clarify the role of Turkey in the Cold War.
The situation became graver after the British note on withdrawal and there was 
little choice for the United Sates but to take the role of Britain as post-war provider of 
economic aid to Greece and Turkey. Although the situation in Greece was more serious, 
because of the damages of the war and the continuing civil war, Turkey was in urgent
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military and economic need as well, since it was still holding a large army against a 
possible Soviet attack, which seriously weakened the Turkish economy.
On February 27 1947, Truman organized a meeting with Congressional leaders 
to explain them the seriousness of the situation and his decision to give aid to Greece 
and Turkey. He told the group that he had decided to extend aid to Greece and Turkey 
and he hoped the “Congress (would) the means to make this aid timely and sufficient.” 
Vandenberg, Acheson and Marshall were the primary officials who helped President 
Truman to gain support for the aid program from the Congress. Vandenberg explained 
the program as a necessary action, which was “to be taken in pursuit of American 
interest, not humanitarian ideals.” Vandenberg also said “the easiest way to win political 
support for them was to talk about the threat of Communism.” ' ' His efforts were 
crucial in gaining bipartisan support for the aid program. For Truman, it was important 
to gain both public and Congressional support for his aid program. He didn’t want the 
speech to be seen as an investment prospectus but as a declaration of general policy. 
According to Tmman, it would be “America’s answer to the surge of expansion of 
Communist tyranny” so it had to be clear and free of hesitation or double talk. It would 
be the turning point in American foreign policy.
On the other hand, it wouldn’t be easy to convince either the Congress to 
approve the legislation or gain international support. There were many obstacles against 
Turkey: It didn’t have a very good image in the United States nor was it a democratic 
country. Some in the Congress stated that Turkey’s first recourse should be to the 
United Nations.'^ Others thought that Turkey was not in a very difficult position 
economically. Robert A. Taft, the Republican leader in the Senate, opposed the bill 
since its military provisions might lead to war with Russia. The majority of the British 
Labor Party and the French government was also skeptical about the Greek-Turkish aid
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bill. The British Prime Minister, Ernest Bevin, did not want a Europe divided into two 
hostile camps and a moderate French cabinet needed Socialist votes which could be lost 
if the Cabinet antagonized the Soviet Union.
However, Truman emphasized that Turkey was in urgent need for military aid 
to resist the Soviet threat. He explained that a major part of the national income in 
Turkey was being spent for military purposes to prepare for and resist a possible Soviet 
attack and military aid to Turkey could lessen the burden of military expenditures on the 
economy, making Turkey stronger to resist a Soviet attack. In addition to this, the 
Truman administration was very successful in manipulating the Congress, the public 
and also the allies of the United States. Paterson asserts that the Truman administration 
quieted or isolated most critics of its foreign policy in a masterful fashion. He adds that, 
on the whole, Truman got what he wanted from the Congress, and Congress did not 
control foreign policy.
Thus, the majority of the Senate and the House approved President Truman’s 
declaration. On May 22, President Truman signed “An Act To Provide Assistance to 
Greece And Turkey” and on July 12, the Turkish Foreign Minister Hasan Saka and the 
American Ambassador in Ankara, Edwin C. Wilson, signed the agreement about the 
application of the Truman Doctrine. Turkey would be granted $100 million as a result 
of this agreement. George Harris, in his work Troubled Alliance, mentioned that the 
Doctrine had created immense happiness in Turkey although some of the articles in the 
agreement, which granted unrestricted freedom to the United States to gather news and 
supervise the use of aid, raised some concerns among the Turkish officials. Turks had 
suffered from capitulations severely during the Ottoman Empire, and, as Harris reveals, 
the most sensitive nerve in the Turkish body politic, was according privileges to 
foreigners.'*  ^ However, parallel with the feelings of the majority of the people, the
26
Turkish press stated that the U.S. showed its commitment to the security of the free 
world not only with its words both also with its acts and it understood that the security 
of the Atlantic region couldn’t be guaranteed without Turkey and Greece.
The Truman Doctrine was followed by the “Marshall Plan” which announced by 
Secretary of State, George Maishall, at Harvard University on June 5, where he talked 
about the need for European recovery believing that a healthy and unrestricted 
economy'** was very important for the existence of any country. Initially, Turkey was 
not included in the countries that were determined to receive aid from the U.S. under the 
provision of the Marshall Plan, and it made the Turkish government to feel as being 
neglected by the United States and being excluded from the Western group.'** but it 
became part of the Plan after demonstrating the serious economic problems in Turkey 
and the possible outcomes of those problems which could not only damage Turkey but 
also Europe in the long-run if they were not solved.
In 1947, not only the political but also the economic conditions in Europe were 
worsening gradually and the Soviet Union became more suspicious and hostile toward 
the American initiatives as was evident at the Foreign Ministers’ Conference that was 
held in Moscow. The Soviet hostility toward American economic plans was pretty clear 
and President Truman said in his memoirs that Secretary of State Marshall had returned 
from Moscow in a pessimistic mood since the Russians were interested “only in their 
own plans, and were coldly determined to exploit the helpless condition of Europe to 
further Communism rather than cooperate with the rest of the world.” Under those 
circumstances, the Truman Administration had to find a method for the economic 
revival of Europe.
In July 1947, sixteen European countries, including Turkey, gathered in Paiis to 
prepare the European Recovery Program as part of the Marshall Plan. Each country was
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required to make forecasts about its production and consumption needs^ export 
opportunities and need for production facilities. The countries then presented those 
reports to the United States and a group of experts from the American government 
prepared their own reports on each country after a careful analysis of the reports 
prepared by the recipient countries.
Turkey expressed its desire to take part in the European Recovery Program and 
requested $615 million from the Marshall Plan to revive the Turkish economy, since the 
American military aid so far didn’t create the expected relief. Oral Sander notes that the 
United States was not very eager to expand aid to Turkey since it saw the Turkish 
economy as not severely damaged by the war like the European countries and as having 
the potential to recover by itself. In the report prepared by the American experts, it was 
stated that the Marshall Plan was not a plan to revive a national economy but a plan to 
reconstruct Europe, which suffered severely from the war. Thus, initially, Turkey 
didn’t receive Marshall Plan assistance.
Although rejected by the United States government, Turkey did not give up its 
efforts to be part of the Marshall Plan. The serious economic problems, which had 
begun by the end of the war, weren’t solved yet and the public and press were pressing 
Ankara to continue its efforts to be part of the Plan. Ankara expressed to Washington 
that Turkey was strategically very vulnerable, and could not cope with the economic 
problems stemming from its political and geographic situation. It was still devoting half 
of its national income to national security and could not recover its economy. It was also 
added that Turkey could help the European economic recovery if it was provided with 
machines and was modernized agriculturally. The increase in agricultural production 
and mining in Turkey could also serve the European recovery. As a result of those 
efforts by the Turkish government, Washington reexamined the situation of Turkey and
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finally decided to include Turkey in the Marshall Plan. On July, 4 1948, the U.S. and 
Turkey signed an Economic Cooperation Agreement.
Turkish-American Relations 1948-1950
The period between the Marshall Plan and the Korean War witnessed very 
important developments in world affairs that accelerated of the Cold War and the 
creation of the most significant alliance of the Cold War, the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization. The Truman administration felt that economic cooperation had to be 
followed by a movement toward common self-protection to cope with a greater Soviet 
threat and NATO, which Turkey would join in 1952, was formed.
By the year 1948, many of the Eastern European countries had fallen under the 
control of Communist parties backed by the Soviet Union. Following the Communist 
take-over in Czechoslovakia in February 1948, the Benelux countries signed the 
Brussels Treaty on March 17, 1948. President Truman stated that “economic 
cooperation has been followed by a movement toward common self protection in the 
face of the growing menace to their freedom”^^  and it was just a first step towards a 
more comprehensive defense organization. The Berlin Blockade in July 1948 increased 
the determination of the United States about a greater defense Pact that would include 
the U.S. and Canada, and the discussions on the North Atlantic Pact began on July 6, 
1948.
From the very beginning, Turkey paid close attention to the formation of the 
North Atlantic Treaty and expressed its will to be a part of this Pact or another security 
system for the Mediterranean region. In February 1949, during the meeting of the 
Organization of European Economic Cooperation in Paris, the Turkish Foreign Minister 
Necmettin Sadak stated that:
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the Atlantic Pact was a defense system for a determined 
geographic region (the north Atlantic region) and thus there was no need 
for Turkey’s membership in it but the European security is indivisible.
For that reason, we want the security system of the Atlantic coast to be 
completed with a treaty in the Mediterranean as well.^ "*
George Harris argued that there were three possible reasons behind the 
immediate interest of the Turkish government to join the organization. First, the Turkish 
authorities feared that Turkey’s exclusion from the Pact would lead to a decrease in the 
U.S. interest and aid to Turkey. Second, the Soviet Union would increase pressure on 
Turkey as a result of barred Soviet advance in Western Europe by the creation of 
NATO. And finally, the RRP (Republican Peoples’ Party) government feared that a 
diplomatic defeat could be exploited by the DP (Democrat Party) opposition in Turkey.
In addition to those motives behind Turkish will to enter into NATO, there was 
another motive as well: an organization like NATO was perceived as the representation 
of Western power by Turkey, and entering into such an organization could assure every 
nation that Turkey was now pait of the West and supported by the West. Hence, the 
Turkish motives to enter into NATO can be summarized as: security interests, economic 
difficulties, political concerns and the will to be part of the West.
NATO was born officially on April 4, 1949 in Washington and the 
signatories were the United States, Canada, Britain, France, Belgium, Netherlands, 
Luxembourg, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and Portugal. The United States didn’t 
consider the membership of Turkey since it was an alliance of a particular region, of 
which Turkey was not a part. In an address by Secretary of State Dean Acheson on 
NATO, that was published in the New York Times on March 19, Acheson stated that the 
“The paramount purpose of the Pact are peace and security” and “if peace and security 
can be achieved in the North Atlantic area, we shall have gone a long way to assure 
peace and security in other areas as well”. Therefore, the major purpose of NATO
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was the security in the North Atlantic area and it was beyond the scope of the Pact to 
include Turkey at the time being.
However, the entry of Italy and the Algerian provinces of France into NATO 
nullified the ‘limited geographical area’ assertion and increased the reactions of 
exclusion in Turkey. Italy was not only a former enemy state of the United States and its 
major allies, but also a state without the connection with the United States such as 
Greece and Turkey had had since 1947^ **, thus Turkey felt more or less betrayed by the 
West.
Following those developments, on April 12, Turkish Foreign Minister Necmettin 
Sadak made a trip to Washington to meet with President Truman and Secretary of State 
Dean Acheson, and expressed President Înônü’s regards to President Truman and 
appreciated American military aid to Turkey. Then Sadak wanted to learn about the 
attitude of the U.S. on Turkey’s entry into NATO, which was the major reason of this 
trip. Acheson expressed that the issue was under study by the United States. Although 
he didn’t give any assurances to Sadak about NATO, Acheson stated that the interest of 
the Americans towards Turkey and the world had increased and the United States could 
think of a new arrangement after the Pact began to operate. Acheson didn’t want the 
alienation of Turkey as a result of the negative answer of the U.S., and tried to convince 
the Turkish Foreign Minister during their meeting that the U.S. had a deep interest to 
Turkey and the happiness of the Turkish people.^^
Sadak was not satisfied with the American answer, and before returning to 
Turkey, he said that it was wrong to exclude Turkey from the Pact while another 
Meditenanean country like Italy was accepted. Turkish reaction to such an incident 
was great; The public and press called for neutrality. A well-known Turkish author 
Peyami Safa wrote that “ There is no more need to care about a common defense system
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that does not care about us. That way, we can shape our foreign policy freely according 
to our neighbors’ goodwill.”
While Turkey was dissatisfied by the American attitude towards Turkey’s entry 
into NATO, another incident made Ambassador Feridun Cemal Erkin disappointed: In a 
conference by the American Ambassador to Ankara, George Wadsworth, in New York, 
he was asked whether Turkey would remain neutral or not in a war in which they were 
not attacked by the Soviet Union. Wadsworth stated that the major aim of the Turks was 
to attach the United States to themselves. It was an answer, which demonstrated Turkey 
as entirely pragmatic and it made Erkin very upset. Erkin stated in his memoirs that it 
was against goodwill and politically immoral to suspect and blame Turkey for neutrality 
while there was no solid commitment to Turkey by the United States and no Turkish 
pledge to the United States that Turkey would enter into war in case of a Soviet attack.^  ^
In spite of the danger of Turkish neutrality and some voices in the Congress 
who advocated Turkey’s membership into NATO, the U.S. would not consider the issue 
until the outbreak of the Korean War, which made a dramatic change in the course of 
the Cold War and on American-Turkish relations.
On March 24, 1950 the Turkish-Italian Treaty of Friendship was signed. 
The Turkish government hoped that this treaty would draw the attention of the U.S. and 
be regarded as the first step of an East Mediterranean Pact, which would include 
Turkey, Italy, Greece and perhaps some Middle Eastern countries. However, the 
Turkish Government’s aim in the long run was to be accepted into NATO, which was 
viewed “as an extension of the United States” by Turkey and a sine-qua-non for the 
Turkish government.
Although Washington was not in favor of Turkey’s entry into NATO at the 
time being, some of the American officials believed that Turkey should be included into
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the North Atlantic Treaty and shouldn’t be left vulnerable before the Soviet Union. In a 
meeting of the State-Defense Policy Review Group on March 2, Dr. James Conant, 
member of General Advisory Committee of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, 
talked about the geographical extent of NATO and recalled the words of Paul Nitze, 
director of State Policy Planning Staff and major contributor of NSC 68, on Turkey’s 
NATO membership:
We must avoid a war but must ask ourselves what is the minimum 
amount of land that we must hold. Can we afford to give up Finland or 
Indo-China? Perhaps, yes. But France would be another matter because 
that could effectively neutralize the U.K. We cannot bargain away any of 
these areas, but we must decide on a line that they cannot cross. Mr.
Nitze indicated that the Atlantic Pact indicates the present line, which 
might also include Turkey.
Thus, the United States began to discuss Turkey’s membership in NATO long 
before the Korean War, although there were many obstacles, which we will examine 
later.
From March till May an East Mediterranean Pact, which included Turkey, was 
recommended by Turkey and especially by Britain. As we’ve mentioned before, 
Turkey’s real aim was entering in NATO in the near future but the creation of an East 
Mediterranean Pact, which included Turkey, could not only be beneficial for Turkey’s 
security interests in the short-run, but also speed up Turkey’s entry into NATO. 
However the East Mediterranean Pact couldn’t be realized since the Arab countries 
opposed to ally with the West that advocated the creation of the state of Israel.
In the face of those developments, Turkey increased its efforts to be a part of 
NATO, which had always been the most favorable option, and applied for membership 
on May 11, 1950. This request was rejected on the same grounds as before. When we 
look at a Top Secret Memorandum dated May 1, 1950, by the Assistant Secretary of 
State for Neai' Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs, George McGhee, we can easily
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see that the U.S. was not in favor of such a security pact with Turkey until the defensive 
capability of Europe was increased. McGhee quotes a document prepared by NEA for 
the Foreign Ministers Meeting and it was stated in the document,
We are not in a position to consider any security pacts with 
Greece, Turkey, Iran or other Near Eastern countries at the present time 
because we cannot tell whether our capabilities at this time are adequate 
to defend our vital interests in Europe. Only an increase in Europe’s own 
defensive strength, resulting from the North Atlantic Treaty and the 
Military Aid Program would permit us to consider further security 
arrangements.^*^
While the Turkish efforts to enter into NATO were continuing, an 
important development occurred: the first democratic elections of Turkey were held and 
on 14 May 1950 where the Democrat Party won the elections, which meant the end of 
twenty-seven years of RPP rule. The United States refeiTed to that as a great victory in 
the name of democracy for not only Turkey but also the world.Moreover, Washington 
was pleased because the new government under the leadership of President Celal Bayai' 
and Prime Minister Adnan Menderes advocated free enterprise and it was a fresh breath 
for Turkey.
Washington congratulated the new government in Turkey in its first day. 
As stated in their election communiqué, the Democratic Party was determined to follow 
the same policy in American-Turkish relations as their predecessors and there would be 
no difference in this respect. Although some scholars interpret the coming of the new 
Government as “secession by the new government from the policy of ‘nonalignment’ 
followed by Atatürk.’’^** Turkey had left its policy of nonalignment and moved towards 
the United States long before the coming of the Democrat Party. The RPP Government 
formed the strong basis of the Turkish foreign policy and the Menderes Government not 
only followed this policy but also strengthened it. However, the Menderes 
administration would be different in other respects from the RPP under the leadership of
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İnönü. Adnan Menderes was a more active and perhaps less cautious leader compared to 
his predecessor İsmet İnönü and the Democrat Party followed a pure American-oriented 
foreign policy throughout the 1950s.
Shortly after Menderes’s coming to office, the most significant event in 
terms of international relations and American-Turkish relations for the period 1945- 
1960 erupted: The Korean War. On June 25, 1950 the North Korean Communists 
crossed the 38'’ parallel, which divided the two Koreas, and attacked South Korea. It not 
only enhanced the (NSC 68)’s credibility"^*’ in the United States but also gave the 
Menderes government a good opportunity to show the Turkish loyalty and commitment 
to the West.
Just after news of the attack had reached Washington on the evening of June 25, 
President Truman ordered U.S. naval and air forces to the region to assist South Korea. 
Moreover, the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution that called for the 
withdrawal of North Korean forces back to the 38'*’ parallel. North Korea rejected this 
resolution and the Council announced the second resolution calling for the United 
Nations members to assist the Republic of Korea and “to restore international peace and 
security in the area.” Now, it was time for Turkey to enter into the scene and “force 
the gates of NATO.”^^
After receiving the message of the UN, the Menderes government announced its 
decision to send a 4,500-man brigade to Korea. It was a very important historical 
decision by Turkey to send such a significant number of troops to a land far from home 
and almost unknown for many people before the war broke out. The memory of the 
Turkish War of Independence, in which Turkey suffered huge losses, wasn’t so distant 
and there was a Soviet threat at the door.
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The major opposition party, RPP, criticized the manner of the decision, if not the 
content"* ,^ since the Menderes Administration didn’t consult with the major opposition 
party when taking the decision and didn’t have parliamentary approval. While, a group 
of leftist intellectuals from the Turkish Peace-lovers Society, acting under the leadership 
of Asst. Prof. Behice Boran from Ankara University, criticized the Government’s 
decision about sending troops to Korea'^ '*, not only the press but also the majority of the 
Turkish people rejoiced the newly elected Prime Minister Menderes’ decision. A lot of 
people ranging from professors to workers, students and writers applied voluntarily to 
recruit the army with the aim of fighting Communism.
By sending troops to Korea the new government not only showed Turkish 
loyalty to the West and to the common principles of the western alliance system, but 
also made a positive effect on the American Congress. Moreover, the United Nations’ 
call to aid South Korea was a good opportunity for Turkey to be a model for the other 
countries that hadn’t answered the United Nations’ call yet. The reply of the Turkish 
government to the United Nations’ resolution came earlier than many of the NATO 
allies and Turkey knew that the American Congress wouldn’t miss that important fact. 
In one of his articles published in the international News Service, just after the Turkish 
decision, Turkish Foreign Minister, Fuad Köprülü, stated that he hoped the United 
States would understand the importance of Turkey for the peace and security of the
Near East better after the Korean War."*^
Another issue of debate is whether Washington had given Turkey any assurances 
in case of Turkish aid to South Korea. According to Ciineyt Arcayürek, a well-known 
Turkish journalist who witnessed the developments of the period. Senator Caine from 
the United States organized a press conference in the American Embassy in Ankai'a 
before the Turkish Government’s decision and asserted that “If Turkey wanted to take
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part within the Western Alliance and improve Turkish-American relations, it should 
send troops to Korea.”'^  ^Senator Caine also stated that he was only one of the American 
senators who advocated Turkey’s membership into the North Atlantic Treaty and added 
that:
The fiee world helps Turkey in case of an attack but it is a two- 
sided system. Having the control of the Straits and the Suez Canal,
Turkey must help a country that was attacked. If Turkey is to be accepted 
as a member of the Atlantic Pact, all the countries can protect themselves 
better. It is impossible to protect only one half of a great sea. If the whole 
sea is to be protected, it’s necessary to include Turkey in NATO." ’^
There had also been some private meetings between the American Ambassador 
George Wadsworth, General McBride and Turkish Foreign Minister Fuad Köprülü 
before the Turkish decision, to discuss the possible actions of Turkey in the coming 
days. In a letter by Wadsworth to Washington dated July 22, 1950, just before Turkey’s 
reply to the United Nations’ call, Wadsworth wrote about a force of 4,500 required by 
General McBride from the Turkish Government. Hence, in the light of that information, 
it can be said that the United States required Turkey to participate in the Korean War 
and moreover gave some informal assurances to the Menderes Government in terms of 
membership in NATO in the near future. Thus, facing the greatest opportunity of its 
entire term, the Menderes Government welcomed the UN resolution and the U.S.’ 
request of aid to South Korea. The United States dispatched five ships to Turkey to 
transport the Turkish troops to Korea and they departed from Turkey on September 25
48under the command of Celal Dora.
The Korean War made the U.S. revise its foreign policy and increase the 
military capability of not only the U.S. as advised by NSC-68, a document prepared by 
the Departments of State and Defense, and the National Security Council, but also of 
other countries to a great extent. NSC 68 was completed by April 1950 and it had 
predicted that the Soviet Union would pose a great threat to the West in the next five
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years with its strategic and military efforts, and called for a massive rearmament. 
However, President Truman had promised to save for domestic purposes when he came 
to office and it was difficult to convince the public and the Congress for such a huge 
military expenditure in time of peace. With the outbreak of the Korean War, which 
convinced the Congress and the public of Communist aggression, he could easily find 
that opportunity. From that time on, the United States’ military power would be 
enhanced dramatically. David T. Fatua’s remarks, in his work The Long Pull Army, are 
quite striking:
The move to expand the Army beyond the fighting in Korea, for 
instance, fundamentally meant that America now had a different type of 
military power. It was a power more appropriate to the demands of the 
Cold War, capable of addressing both total and now limited warfare. In 
short, it was more useable. In this sense, America’s overall national 
power, diplomatic and military, was greatly enhanced.
This new military and foreign policy formulation of the U.S., which was greatly 
shaped after the Korean War, brought new inteipretations to the United States’ relations 
with other countries including Turkey. It shouldn’t be forgotten that Turkey’s entry into 
NATO was not only the result of the Turkish contribution to the Korean War but also 
the changing interpretation of the Communist threat, which could pose a great danger if 
Turkey chose neutrality. According to this new interpretation, the Soviet Union was an 
ever-growing global threat and didn’t hesitate to engage in aggressive overtures against 
any country. According to a report by the National Security Council dated August 25, 
1950, it was argued that the Korean War could be interpreted as: “the first phase of a 
general Soviet Plan for global war’’.^ ” In the same document, it was also stated that:
The USSR action in regard to Korea, and its employment of 
satellite forces there, should be regarded not as an isolated phenomenon 
but possibly as part of a general plan which might involve coirelated 
action in other parts of the world...The USSR has the military capability 
to occupy any country on its periphery, to invade Western Europe and the 
Near and Middle East, to make direct attacks upon the United Kingdom
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and Alaska, and upon shipping, and to reinforce the communist military
effort in the Far East. 51
According to Washington, the Korean War was “only an additional and more 
acute manifestation of the chronic world situation resulting from Kremlin’s design for 
world domination through international communist conspiracy.”^^  Under those 
circumstances, the United States should take the necessary measures to prevent the 
Soviet threat. In this effort, the first step was to find the regions or countries, which 
would be potential targets of Soviet aggression in the near future and therefore lead to a 
global war. Those countries were revealed as Turkey, Greece, Iran, Yugoslavia, 
Pakistan, Afghanistan or Finland in the National Security Council Report. In the same 
report it was stated that the Turkish Straits were very important for the American 
Security interests in the Eastern Meditenanean and the Middle East regions:
Without automatically starting global war by attacking American 
troops or a country covered by the North Atlantic Treaty, the principal 
areas where actual Soviet forces could be employed for a local purpose 
are Iran, Turkey, Yugoslavia, Greece, Afghanistan, Pakistan, or 
Finland...
In the case of Turkey, the control of the Turkish Straits and the 
approaches to the eastern Mediterranean represent very important 
military considerations from the point of view of Soviet defense as well 
as a traditional and deep-seated Russian objective. The denial of Soviet 
control of the Turkish straits is vital to the security interests of the United 
States. Therefore a direct USSR attack on Turkey would involve serious 
risk of precipitating global war.^^
Apart from the reappraisal of the importance of the Turkish Straits Just after the 
Korean War, the U.S. also decided on the specific immediate actions to be taken in case 
of another overt aggression by the Soviet Union. Here, we can see that Washington 
offered similar action plans for both Turkey and Greece, and called for accelerated 
military assistance to Greece and Turkey as well as an increase in the military potential 
of those countries which were likely to be targets of further Soviet aggression and were 
in an area whose security was of vital concern to the security of the United States.^ "* It
39
should be noted that the U.S. didn’t call for such military assistance and military action 
to other target countries such as Finland, Afghanistan, Yugoslavia, in case of an overt 
Soviet aggression. Iran, on the other hand, could rely on the U.K. for aid if it was faced 
with an attack by the Soviet Union. Thus, the major recipients of the U.S. assistance 
were revealed as Turkey and Greece.
Believing that it had the support of the United States now, Turkey made its 
second application to enter into NATO on August 1, 1950. In fact, Washington was 
debating the issue quite seriously since the early spring of 1950. The Truman 
administration knew that Turkey could chose to be neutral if there was no official 
alliance between Turkey and the U.S. and it was a great risk for the security interests of 
the West if there was a Soviet attack. In March 1950, the United States air attaché had 
emphasized that Turkey would resist if attacked but otherwise would attempt to remain 
neutral^^. Admiral Richard Connoly was another advocate of Turkish membership in 
NATO and he wished to get the JCS support to have an alliance with Turkey and stated 
that:
Although it can be assumed that Turkey would fight if attacked it 
is almost as certain that Turkey would not fight if not attacked and very 
probable that USSR would not immediately attack Turkey. It would 
therefore be greatly to our national interest considering money we have 
spent on her military establishment to have Turkey bound to us formally 
by mutual defense treaty, to include an engagement for her to go to war 
in case of attack upon her own territory or upon or through any 
neighboring contiguous state.^^
After the Korean War and the contribution of Turkey to the war, the subject 
began to be stressed more in the Congressional meetings. On September 11,1950, 
Senator Cain emphasized the importance of including Turkey in NATO and asserted 
that:
To my mind there is reason to include Greece and Turkey in the 
Atlantic Pact or in some other defensive alliance because they represent 
the eastern flanks of the Mediterranean Sea.
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During World War II both Hitler and Churchill continued to press 
Turkey into the war on one side or the other. Turkey just sat tight. The 
war might well have been concluded much sooner if Turkey had 
committed herself to the Allied side.
If we can help it Turkey must not be permitted to remain neutral 
in a future war. Turkey needs us and we need Turkey. There are three 
great things which Turkey presently possesses and which certain other 
nations I could mention do not possess. They are: pride; a determination 
and willingness to fight; terrain.
In spite of those positive feelings of influential American officials about 
Turkey’s entry into NATO, the request of Turkey was debated in the Foreign Ministers’ 
Meeting in September 1950, and was rejected on the grounds that the United States was 
not ready to make further commitments. It was a common decision of the State 
Department and the JCS which applied to both Turkey and Greece. In a memorandum 
by Secretary of State Dean Acheson to the Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson, 
Acheson stated that it had been the policy of the United States not to extend the formal 
security commitments of the U.S. until the collective defense capacity of the treaty 
nations were strengthened.^* He added that: “A specific promise to commit forces to aid 
these countries without the capability to do so would result, in the event of hostilities, in 
disillusionment and bitterness which probably would have serious consequences both 
during and after the war.”
Moreover, accepting Turkey into NATO would necessarily require the inclusion 
of Greece and perhaps Iran, which meant a greater responsibility and commitment for 
the United States. According to Acheson, “the inclusion of Turkey in the North Atlantic 
Treaty would require for political reasons the inclusion of Greece, although Iran might 
be excluded on the grounds that it is not a European country.” Although Iran could be 
excluded from the Pact, the United States had to give some assurances to fian in order 
to minimize adverse political and morale affects in Iran^ ’' in case of the inclusion of 
Turkey and Greece. Hence, in the meeting between the U.S., British and French
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delegations on August 29, it was stated that “Greek and Turkish accession to the NATO 
would create new problems of organization and planning since the adherence would 
involve two new countries from a new area.”^^
Thus, Washington began to look for other alternatives short of full participation 
for Turkey and Greece, due to pressures from the Turkish government.The Department 
of State emphasized five possible actions regarding U.S. policy towards Turkey and 
Greece, and Acheson wanted the Department of Defense to choose the best option from 
the military point of view. Those options were given as:
a) including Greece and Turkey, and possibly later Iran, as 
members of the North Atlantic Treaty;
b) giving these countries, temporarily at least, a consultative 
status in the Treaty organization;
c) establishing a new area pact along the lines of the Atlantic 
Treaty, with the U.S., British and French guaiantees either on a 
reciprocal or non-reciprocal basis;
d) declaring, possibly jointly with the British and French that the 
West would not tolerate armed aggression against Greece, Turkey or 
fran, with assurances to the three countries that United States aid in the 
maximum amount possible consistent with itsother commitments would 
be provided;
e) other appropriate courses of action to meet the present 
situation.
The answer of John.son to Acheson’s letter came on September 11, 1950. 
The Department of Defense advised that the United States should grant an “associate 
status” to Turkey and Greece in NATO so that their representatives might participate 
without delay in coordinating planning. '^^ Secretary Johnson also recommended that as 
soon as the defense of the member nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
was reasonably assured, the United States would consider raising the question of full 
membership for Turkey and Greece in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.^^ But it 
wasn’t the right time yet to include Turkey and Greece in NATO.
While the United States was debating the action plan for Turkey, the 
Turkish Government was waiting for a reply from Washington impatiently. Both the
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Menderes Government and public were expected a positive reply from Washington 
since Turkey did its best in the Korean War by sending a significant number of troops to 
Korea to fight beside the Americans and now it was the turn of Washington to hold its 
promise. On September 19, 1950, Turkish Ambassador Feridun Cemal Erkin and 
Secretary of State Dean Acheson met in New York to discuss the decision of the United 
States concerning Turkey’s membership. Acheson explained the proposal of the Council 
which offered Turkey an “associate status” and invited Turkey to associate itself with 
such appropriate phases of the military planning work of the North Atlantic Treaty 
organization which were concerned with the defense of the Meditenanean area.^  ^While 
making the proposal, the U.S. knew that Turkey would not long remain satisfied and 
would press for early full membership.^^ As predicted by Washington, Erkin expressed 
his disappointment and said that he did not understand how could Turkey be expected to 
participate in the defense of the Mediterranean without some prior political 
commitments. He added that “the disappointment of the Turkish people (would) be very 
great” and “the USSR might now be encouraged to believe that the NATO Powers had, 
in fact, no fundamental interest in Turkey.
In spite of this dissatisfaction, Turkey accepted the proposal of the NATO 
Council but did not give up its efforts to join NATO throughout 1951. Here we 
shouldn’t forget that rhe only obstacle before Turkey’s entry into NATO was not the 
United States since Britain and the Scandinavian members of the Pact too were against 
Turkey’s membership. Britain had important interests in the Middle East, and especially 
over the Suez Canal, and it couldn’t let Soviet influence in the region, which would 
jeopardize its interests. The signs of Soviet influence in the region had already been 
given with the Soviet efforts in Iran or good Soviet-Arab relations especially after the 
creation of the state of Israel.
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Britain wanted to formulate a Middle East Command, which would focus on the 
preservation of the status quo and protection of the vital interests of Britain in the 
region. This Command would be separate from NATO and serve the defense of the 
Middle East rather than directly the defense of Europe.*'  ^ For Britain, it was a great 
fomiulation because neither NATO nor the British-French-Turkish Treaty of Mutual 
Assistance of 1939 could force Turkey to help the British if there was an attack on the 
Arab countries. Without the participation of Turkey, it was very hard for Britain to 
protect its interests in the region. Thus, Britain wanted Turkey and Greece to be part of 
the Middle East Command rather than NATO. Although Turkey ‘s aim was still to enter 
into NATO, it didn’t oppose such a formulation, and Turkish Foreign Minister Fuad 
Köprülü stated on 20 July 1951 that Turkey would accomplish its own duty in realizing 
the Middle East defense. Turkey believed that the Middle East Command could only be 
a step to realize its major foreign policy puipose. However, the cost of its policy 
would be high for Turkey since almost all the Arab countries challenged the Middle 
East Command, and perceived Turkey as working together with the Western 
imperialists. Thus, the Arab-Turkish relations, which were not very close, deteriorated 
further as a result of Western-Turkish cooperation in the Middle East.
The major concerns of the Scandinavians, on the other hand, were that the 
extension of NATO to Muslim Turkey and Orthodox Greece would weaken the unity of 
the European community. Moreover, the military aid flowing to their countries would 
decrease if Turkey would become a member of the Pact.
However, the general view of Turkey was that the European opposition to 
Turkey’s entry into NATO could be eliminated by the United States if it really wanted 
so. In one of his meetings with George McGhee, Turkish Ambassador Cemal Erkin 
stated that:
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I cannot understand your deep concerns about your European 
allies. Do they smile to our faces and give the full responsibility to your 
indecisiveness? Which one of those weary European allies could help us 
in case of an attack by the Soviet Union. The United States, which 
represents the entire strength of the Pact, is in a position to convince the 
other allies once it makes its decision...^'
The Turkish thesis appeared to be true when the concerns of both the British and 
the Scandinavians were eliminated by 1951 mainly as a result of the United States’ 
efforts throughout the year. One of the reasons of an increased elfort by the United 
States to include Turkey in NATO was the perception of a Sino-Soviet bloc as result of 
Chinese entry into the Korean War through the end of 1950 and the changing image of 
China as a more hostile state to the United States. Thus, it can be argued that the spread 
of U.S. commitments was accelerated by the changing image of China and the United
States began to think that any Communist victory anywhere would threaten vital
• · 1'^American interests. “
By the spring of 1951, the advocates of Turkey’s entiy into NATO increased in 
the United States not only because of this strong perception of a Sino-Soviet bloc and 
the increased Communist threat, but also because of Turkish contribution to the Korean 
War and the fear of Turkish neutrality. In his speech on March 15, 1951 Senator Cain 
had emphasized, in a very vigorous way, the heroism of the Turkish troops in Korea and 
advocated Turkey’s entry into NATO:
What Turkey has done in Korea ought to make a scare of nations I 
could name totally ashamed of themselves. Turkey had less reason to 
participate in the war in Korea than a scare of nations I could mention.
Turkey sits right on the boundary of Russia. Turkey had a right to say 
‘Our national interest is here. Our fear of the Soviet is supreme. We are 
not nor have we permitted to become a member of the Atlantic Pact, and 
therefore we have no deep-seated obligation to the nations which are 
fighting in Korea.’
Mr. President, Turkey said no such thing. Turkey has sent to 
Korea some of the finest fighting men this world has ever known. If 
every nation among the 53 nations, which in June 1950 signed the 
resolution calling for the stopping of the aggressor, had done what
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Turkey has done, the war already would be over. At least, there is sound 
reason to support this contention.
We are having our monumental and inexclusable troubles in 
Korea because we do not have enough Turks, or because we do not have 
enough allies who are motivated by the understanding and the courage 
and the willingness to participate that the Turks have so clearly 
demonstrated by their actions and their blood and their scarifies. One 
does not need to be an American to get excited over the Turks. All one 
has to be is a human being.
George McGhee, who was appointed as Ambassador to Turkey by President 
Truman in December 1951, was another influential advocate of Turkey’s entry into 
NATO. He liked Turks and Turkey very much and made a great contribution for 
Turkish membership in NATO. The efforts of Cain, McGhee and the State
Department officials, who were the most vigorous proponents of expanding military 
assistance and commitments throughout the Middle East^ ,^ combined with the fear of 
Turkey’s neutrality, made the Defense Department reconsider Turkey’s admission into 
NATO. Finally in May 1951 the JCS decided to expand military commitments 
throughout the Middle East, because Turkey was important in protecting West’s 
southern flank by “waging war·, protecting air bases, and safeguarding Middle Eastern 
oil resources.”
The United States, resolving the problem of opposition by the Department of 
Defense at home, now began to convince the other NATO allies who resisted Turkey’s 
entry into NATO. Britain, the major opponent, could only be persuaded on condition of 
the creation of a Middle East Command, which would include Turkey and protect 
British interests in the Middle East. Both Turkey and the United States agreed to it. The 
rest of the allies were also persuaded mainly by the efforts of the United States in the 
summer and autumn of 1951. The NATO Council of Ministers gathered in Ottawa on 
16-20 September, 1951 and it was agreed that Turkey should be invited to be a member 
of NATO. In his message to the Turkish President Celal Bayar, President Truman
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asserted that they “look forward to working with Turkey in this organization to help 
build the bastions of the free world for defense against the Communist menace which 
Turkey knows so well” ’^ and Bayar stated in his reply that “Turkey will never fail to 
carry out the obligations that will devolve upon her within the Atlantic Pact community 
which she is about to join.” *^* Turkey entered into NATO officially on February 18, 
1952 as a full-lledged member. It was not only the end of a very tumultuous period but 
also the beginning of a new era in terms of American-Turkish relations.
The period between 1947 and 1952 witnessed a hard time in American-Turkish 
relations and fits perfectly to the “gilded age” argument of American-Turkish relations. 
Although it began with the Truman Doctrine and ended with Turkey’s entry into 
NATO, both of which were accepted as the proof of American commitment to Turkey, 
the period also demonstrated that the alliance of the two countries were quite fragile 
underneath their expressions of perfect harmony and could easily be hurt as a result of 
American hesitancy to support Turkey, who tied its foreign policy to the U.S., in various 
issues.
47
NOTES:
' See Appendix for the Address by Harry Truman .
“ Truman, vol. //,, 103.
 ^ Armaoglu, op.cit., 156.
Ibid., 156.
Truman, op. cit., 106.
Oral Sander, op.cit., 18.
Leffler, op. cit., 808.
Ibid., 813-814.
Ibid., 815.
Truman, op. cil., 105.
Paul Y. Hammond, The Cold War Years: American Foreign Policy since 1945.
The Cold War Years, 22.
Truman, op. cit.. 111.
'  ^ Sander, op.cit., 23.
William C. Mallalieu, “The Origin of the Marshall Plan: A Study in Policy Formation and National 
Leadership”, Political Science Quarterly 73 (1958), 485.
Thomas Paterson, Soviet-American Confrontation, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University, 1973), 266. 
Harris, op. cit., 27.
Mehmet Gönlübol, Olaylarla Türk Dn^  Politikası, ¡919-1973, (Ankara: Sevinç, 1974), 229.
Mallalieu, op. cit., 487; Scott Jackson, “Prologue to the Marshall Plan: The Origins of the American 
Commitment for a European Recovery Program”, The Journal of American History, 1054.
Nasuh Uslu, Turk-Amerikan ilişkileri, (Ankara: 21. Yuzyil Yayinlar, 2000), 98.
Truman, op. cit., 118.
Sander, op. cit., 47; Mehmet Gönlübol, op. cit., 477.
““ Gönlübol, op. cit., 476-484.
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., ed.. The Dynamics of World Power 1945-1973 (New York: Chelsea House 
Publishers, 1973), 127.
Gonlubol, op. cit., 241.
Harris, Ibid.,, 35-36.
Schlesinger, Jr., op. cit., 134.
Oral Sander, op. cit., 68.
Dean Acheson, “Present at the creation : my years in the State Department”, (New York: Norton, 
1969), 279.
Feridun Cemal Erkin, Disislerinde 34 Yil, Washington Büyükelçiliği, (Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu 
Basimevi, 1986)
Soysal, op. cit.,76-77.
Sander, op. cit., 69.
Erkin, op. cit., 106-107.
Sander, op. cit., 70.
Harris, op. cit., 44.
-^-‘^ FRUS, 1950, vol.I, 173 
FRUS, 1950, Vol.3, 79-80.
Erkin, op. cit., 147.
Hüseyin Bağcı, Türk Dış Politikasında 1950Ίι Yıllar, (Ankara: METU, 2001), 37.
Soysal, op. cit., 97.
David Fatua, “The ‘Long Pull’ Army: NSC 68, the Korean War, and the Creation of the Cold War U.S. 
Army”, The Journal of Military History 61 (1997), 110.
William Stueck, The Korean War: An International History (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
1995), 12.
George Harris, op. cit., 40.
Feroz Ahmad, Demokrasi Surecinde Türkiye, 1945-1980 (Istanbul: HiL 1994).477.
Soysal, op. cit., 101.
Sander op. cit., 74; Ahmad, op. cit., 476.
Cüneyt Arcayürek, Şeytan Üçgeninde Türkiye (Ankara: Bilgi, 1987), 376.
Bağcı, op., cit., 23.
Celal Dora, Kore Savaşı Ίηία Türkler (İstanbul: İsmail Akgün, 1963), 30.
48
'‘‘Mbid., 117.
FRUS, 1950, volume I, 378.
Ibid., 379.
Ibid., 385.
Ibid., 382.
Ibid., 387.
Melvyn Leffler, op. cit., 820.
Ibid., 820.
”  NARA, Congressional Record, vol.96, part II, September 11, 1950, 14518-14519.
FRUS, 1950, vol. Ill, 238.
'^FRUS, 1950, vol., Ill, 239.
“  Ibid., 238.
Ibid., 238.
' Ibid., 1142.
Ibid., 240.
Ibid., 278.
Ibid., 278.
FRUS, vol.III, 333.
FRUS, vol. Ill, 239.
FRUS, vol.III, 334.
Gonlubol, op. cit., 248.
™ Sander, op. cit., 75.
Erkin, op. cit., 180.
Robert Jervis, “The Impact of the Korean War on the Cold War”, 584.
NARA, Congressional Record, Senate, vol.97, part II, 82'"' Congression, session, 1951.
Kemal Baglum, Anipolitik J945-1960 (Ankara: Bilgi, 1991), 225. Baglum states that, there was a rumor 
in Turkey that the United States sent one of its most favorite ambassadors, McGhee, to Turkey as a 
gesture for the first democratic elections in Turkey.
Leffler, op. cit., 823.
Ibid., 824.
Department of State Bulletin, October 8, 1951, 571.
Ibid., 650.
49
CHAPTER III
During the period between 1952 and 1960, the United States put emphasis on the 
security of the Middle East in its foreign policy and tried to prevent Soviet influence 
from penetrating the region. Successful or not, Turkey was the key figure of the United 
States foreign policy in the region and Washington saw Turkey as a mediator between 
the Middle East and the West throughout the period. Although there occuired no great 
problems in the period after 1952, it was not a period of perfect harmony either. The 
first disagreement between the two countries was that Turkey wanted a legal base for 
MEDO (Middle East Defense Organization) like NATO, but this request was rejected 
by the U.S. since it didn’t want to alienate the Middle East countries. Second 
disagreement was again the American reluctance to be part of Baghdad Pact, which was 
formulated after the failure of MEDO, due to similar concerns. Third, the use of Incirlik 
air base by the Americans during the intervention in Lebanon created some problems 
between the two governments both during and after the intervention. This chapter aims 
to explore that, although the American-Turkish relations were expected to strengthen 
after Turkey’s entry into NATO in 1952, it was damaged due to American reluctance to 
participate actively in the Middle East defense together with Turkey and its unilateral 
act in Lebanese intervention. Thus the period between 1953 and 1960 was not a period 
of perfect hamiony either, although it was not as problematic as the period following.
When we examine the diplomatic talks between the U.S. and Turkish 
governments Just after Turkey’s entry into NATO, we can see that the majority of those 
talks focused on the role of Turkey in the Balkans and especially in the Middle East. 
The United States wanted to get Yugoslavia, which broke with the Soviet Union and 
expelled from the Comintern in 1948, into the Western defense system. The existing
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line of defense stretched from the North Atlantic region to Iran and the attachment of 
Yugoslavia to the Western defense system would fill the gap in that system.' Turkey 
and Greece would be the ones to cooperate with Yugoslavia in such an alliance in the 
Balkans.
Starting from February 1952, the U.S. State Department began to closely 
monitor the Greek and Turkish governments’ efforts to establish better relations with 
Yugoslavia. The Turkish Republic had always been in favor of good relations with the 
Balkan states since Atatürk and now the Menderes Government was enthusiastic to ally 
with Yugoslavia. The reason behind the Turkish will to cooperate with Yugoslavia was 
not only to gain an important ally in the Balkans against the Soviet threat, but also the 
encouragement by the United States to Turkey to form the Balkan Pact and the Turkish 
dependence on American economic and militaiy aid. Thus, Turkey and the United 
States were equally keen to form the Balkan Pact.
Although Yugoslavia was a Communist country and Turkey disliked Communist 
ideology and tendencies, it welcomed the idea of making an alliance with Yugoslavia 
and even was in favor of attachment of Yugoslavia to the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization. In a conversation between the U.S. Ambassador to Turkey, George 
McGhee and the Turkish Foreign Minister Fuad Köprülü, McGhee asked whether or not 
the Turk-Yugoslav relations could be adversely affected by the strong anti-Communist 
position of the Turkish government. Köprülü answered that “Although Turkey disliked 
Communism, she was prepared to collaborate with Yugoslavia despite her Communist 
policies provided Yugoslavia had no aggressive intent.”  ^Moreover, in his return Irom 
the NATO meeting in Paris, on January 6, 1953, Köprülü stated that time would soon be 
ripe to attach Yugoslavs to NATO, preferably by direct entry.^
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The talks between the Turkish and Yugoslav Governments gained momentum 
by late 1952 and early 1953 under close surveillance of the United States, and the three 
governments, Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia, signed a Treaty of Friendship and 
Cooperation on February 28, 1953. The Pact strengthened the economic and military 
ties between Yugoslavia and the United States and thus, it was a complete success for 
American foreign policy. In spite of the Soviet reactions, the Pact was strengthened in 
1953 and 1954. It became a real military alliance on August 9,1954 with the signing of 
the Mutual Assistance Agreement. On August 10, Secretary of State Dulles said he had 
hoped that the Balkan Agreement would be more extensive in the field of application 
but it was still very important with the prevailing status for the defense of the Southern 
Europe.''
Although it was created with great expectations, the Balkan Pact didn’t last very 
long because of changing conditions and internal strife. By 1955, Yugoslavia felt that 
the Soviet danger was removed. In a speech, Tito noted that, “I am deeply convinced of 
this (the end of the Soviet threat). Then why should we brandish our arms?”  ^ Tito 
implied that there was no more need for a military cooperation with Turkey and Greece 
who bound their foreign policies to the West.^ Tito, who began to reassess the Yugoslav 
foreign policy after the death of Stalin in 1953, felt no need or use of the Balkan Pact 
after Khrushchev’s efforts of rapprochement with Yugoslavia. Another reason for the 
failure of the Balkan Pact was the dispute between Turkey and Greece over Cyprus, 
which gained momentum when Greece took the issue to the United Nations in August 
1954.
Turkey and the United States showed the greatest effort to save the Balkan Pact. 
Anxious about the strained Turkish-Greek relations. Secretary of State Dulles stated that 
the United States had been helping Turkey and Greece to retain their fi'eedom with the
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idea that they had a strong cooperation in a very delicate region and if this alliance was 
damaged the results would be very significant.^ This was a warning to both 
governments to keep their friendly cooperation and to serve the security of the region. 
However, the efforts of Turkey and the United States to revive the Balkan Pact were 
futile and the Pact died before making any important contribution to the security of the 
Balkans.
The second regional alliance encouraged by the United States and led by Turkey 
was the Baghdad Pact, one of the most important alliances in the Middle East 
throughout the Cold War, created to unite the Middle Eastern countries against the 
Soviet threat. The efforts by Washington to strengthen its position in the Middle East 
had started during the Truman Administration but they gained momentum under the 
Eisenhower Administration and its “new look” policy.
As indicated before, the major ally of the United States was Turkey in realizing 
the United States’ foreign policy objectives in the Middle East. George McGhee, the 
Ambassador in Turkey between January 1952 and May 1953, noted that “Turkey not 
only served as a source of guidance for the United States in its Middle Eastern affairs 
but also acted as a mediator and tried to get influence over its ex-dominions in the name 
of the United States”*^ throughout the 1950s. Before dealing with the American-Turkish 
relations during the Eisenhower Administration, we should first look at the diplomatic 
talks between Turkey and the United States on the security of the Middle East, just after 
Turkey’s entry into NATO.
The conversations between President Celal Bayai· and Ambassador George 
McGhee during the President’s private railway train trip on 6 May 1950 were quite 
interesting in revealing the American and Turkish ideas about Turkey’s role in the 
Middle East. After a talk on the economic development of Turkey, a discussion
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developed about Turkey’s role in the Middle East and the Ambassador stated that 
Turkey was the natural leader of the Middle East because of its historical position, 
military strength, political stability, economic development, and membership in NATO. 
McGhee explained the efforts by the United States, since the Roosevelt Administration, 
to win the confidence of the Latin American states through the ‘“Good Neighbor 
Policy” and noted that Turkey could use a similar policy in the Middle East to win the 
Aiab countries.'^ President Bayar welcomed those views, but he pointed out that Turkey 
had, for a long time, ignored the Middle East in its strong efforts to associate itself with 
the West and obtain admission to NATO.'^ Thus, it would not be very easy for Turkey 
to win the confidence of the Arab states again. However, he stated that Turkey could 
now do something to improve its relations with the Middle East states since it was now 
admitted to NATO. Turkey would later see that its participation in NATO and its close 
cooperation with the United States was an important reason why the Arabs didn’t trust 
Turkey and rejected to cooperate with it.
In July 1952, the Acting Regional Planning Advisor, Tammy Hoskins, 
documented a detailed memorandum of the re-appraisal of U.S. policies in the Near 
East. Hoskins stated that not only the position of the U.S., the U.K. and France, but also 
of Turkey was weakened in the Middle East. It was stated that Turkey’s weakened 
position stemmed from “the fact that a growing number of people in the Arab states feel 
that Turkey has decided to orient itself heavily toward Europe and NATO rather than 
primarily as a Middle East and Asian power.”" Another reason for the diminishing 
prestige of the U.S. and Turkey in the Middle East was the policy of both countries 
toward Israel, which created distrust among the Arabs.
Although there were some difficulties, the United States felt the need to increase 
its leadership in the Middle East. The United States wished to fill the gap in the Middle
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East caused by the lessened capabilities of France and the U.K. to supply leadership in 
the region before the Soviet Union would do so. One of the first steps would be to have 
a stronger regional defense against communism and a possible attack by the USSR. 
Since it was proved that the Middle East Command, which was advocated by the United 
Kingdom, would not work out due to Egyptian refusal to cooperate, regional defense 
would be provided by another organization. Hence, the Middle East Defense 
Organization (MEDO), a planning and training concept on which State and Defense had
I 2agreed was, formulated.
The United States gave an important role to Turkey in MEDO. Starting from the
summer of 1952, the United States began to increase the Turkish interest in MEDO and
encouraged Turkey to form good relations with the Middle East states. As indicated
before, the Aiab-Turkish relations hadn’t been very good since Turkey had tied its
foreign policy to the United States to a great extent and was considered as traitor by the
Arabs. However, the Turkish Government was ready to form closer ties with the Arab
states and moreover expressed itself as the most capable state to do so knowing the
Arabs very well. The Turkish foreign minister Fuad Köprülü stated, in July 1952, that:
The British and the French, who have traditionally had colonies and 
spheres of influence in the Arab States, did not understand the Arabs.
They knew very well the present leaders, whom they themselves had 
created. They knew how the leaders lived, what sort of furniture they had 
in their homes, and their personal habits but their knowledge did not go 
beyond this...Only the Turks, among the powers concerned, really 
understood the Arabs. Speaking very broadly...the Turks had the best 
possibilities for approaching the Arab states with respect to the proposed 
command.'^
In fact, Turkey had historical, geographical and cultural ties with the Middle 
East countries and it seemed like a precious asset for the West to make use of this 
particularity of Turkey, now the greatest ally of the United States in the region. 
However, in actuality, it was too optimistic to think that the Arabs and Turks could form
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friendly relations with each other and cooperate for the defense of the Middle East. 
First, the Arab nationalism was an important obstacle for good relations between Arabs 
and Turks. Arabs had never accepted Turks as one of themselves and there had been 
deep-rooted problems between the two. There was a well-known a proverb by the Turks 
to express the Turkish skepticism and discontent about the Arabs: Neither the candy 
from Damascus nor the face of the Arab. Second, Arabs saw the West as a bigger threat 
to their security than the Soviet Union due to their past experiences, and it made 
cooperation with the west, or its ally Turkey, far more difficult for the Arabs. Thus, 
whether or not the Turkish interest in the Arabs was authentic or not, it was known by 
the Turkish Government that they should make intense efforts to from good relations 
with the Arabs.
On the other hand, there was a disagreement between Turkey and the United 
States over Turkey’s desire for a legal base for MEDO like NATO. The United States 
opposed it. The Arab states could not accept such a Western defense organization in the 
Middle East and the political atmosphere in the region could not offer enough stability 
for such a legal agreement for the time being. McGhee pointed out that it was a very 
weak possibility for the new organization to become a part of NATO since it was 
already hard for most of the European countries to accept even Greece and Turkey into 
the Western alliance system.
The talks between the United States and Turkey continued throughout the summer 
of 1952 and early 1953. The year 1953 witnessed two important developments: the 
coming of Dwight Eisenhower, who was famous with his “New Look” policy, to the 
U.S. presidency, and the death of Soviet Premier Stalin on March 5. The latter 
development brought some changes in Soviet policy and it became less aggressive in 
tone. Before going through the consequences of the new foreign minister J. F. Dulles’
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visit to the Middle East and changing Soviet policy, it’s necessary to look at the 
National Intelligence Estimate dated Januaiy 15, 1953 prepared by the United States in 
order to understand the importance of Turkey in the region.
It was stated in the document that the West had a specific and basic concern with 
the extensive oil resources and strategic location of the region and the loss of those 
assets would give an important damage to the West. It was also argued that, the Soviet 
Union would encourage disorder and anti-Westernism in the Middle East to create 
friction among the states of the area and between them and the West. Another important 
estimate was that the Middle Eastern states, except Iran, did not feel immediately 
threatened by the USSR and feared that the Western support would lead to Western 
domination. The U.S. association with Israel could be counted as another obstacle 
before formation of good U.S. Arab relations. Under those circumstances, the 
Eisenhower Administration gave priority to the Middle East in its foreign policy and 
assigned Turkey a key role in the Middle East. The Secretary of State, Dulles, organized 
a trip to the Middle East and South Asian countries between 9-29 May 1953 to observe 
the conditions and then formulate a policy for achieving unity against Communism in 
the region. This trip was extremely important for the American-Turkish relations in the 
1950s since the “Northern Tier” concept, which included Turkey, was formulated after 
this visit by the Secretary of State.
During his visit to Ankara, Dulles asked for the views and advice of the Turkish 
leaders. He wanted to learn the Turkish interpretation of present Soviet policy and the 
ways to achieve greater unity in the Middle East. The Turkish President, Celal Bayar, 
stated that there was no change in the Soviet policy after the death of Stalin; the Soviet 
Union still attempted to rule the world. According to Bayai·, the present moves by the 
USSR were just efforts to gain time by appearing to make concessions in order to
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increase their strength. Adnan Menderes, meanwhile, added that Turkey, as the 
backbone in the defense of the Middle East, needed military aid, perhaps more than any 
other state, to carry out its duty as “guardian of civilization and an element of security in 
this part of the world.” '^
During the Secretary of State’s visit to Ankara, the Turkish side urged the 
establishment of an organization for Middle East defense to include the United States, 
Turkey, the United Kingdom and France.'^ However, the State Department argued that 
an exclusively Western organization for the Middle East as proposed by the Turks 
couldn’t work out because it might generate reactions from the Middle East countries 
and they should promote increasingly close cooperation with those states of the Middle 
East which were most conscious of the Soviet threat and most disposed to cooperate 
with the Western powers.'*^
Therefore, Dulles’ conclusions after his Middle East visit were:
1) that any sound regional defense organization must spring from the 
desires of the people and the governments of the area in question;
2) that most of the Middle Eastern peoples and governments, as of that 
time, were unwilling to be associated with the West in such a defense 
organization;
3) that the states of the “northern tier” of the Middle East were the most 
aware of the Soviet menace, the most likely to do something about it, and 
the best situated to provide protection to the area as a whole.
The northern tier, mentioned by Dulles, was comprised of the states that were
neighbors to the Soviet Union including Turkey and the states who were aware of the
Communist threat. Rather than joint planning for regional defense, the new concept
advocated cooperation with individual states and an expanded cooperation only when
individual states made their choice for it. Turkey was determined as the cornerstone of
the northern tier being the most powerful state and the only NATO member in the
region.^' From that time on, Turkey began to seek alliances with other Middle Eastern
states individually and the first country to move toward was Pakistan.
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Washington supported a Turkish-Pakistani rapprochement since it saw Pakistan as 
a potential position of strength and as the eastern cornerstone for a Middle East defense 
system.^^ Thus, by the end of 1953 and the beginning of 1954, the diplomatic talks 
between Turkey and Pakistan increased and on April 2, 1954 Turkey and Pakistan 
signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation. For Washington, it was an important 
development for the security of the whole Middle East. Köprülü also interpreted the 
situation as one of the most encouraging developments in the past several months or 
even perhaps in the last several years.“^  The security of the region would be guaranteed 
further if Iran and Iraq would be a part of that regional cooperation, in the near future.
As agreed with the United States, the Turkish government increased diplomatic 
talks with the Middle East states by 1955. Prime Minister Menderes made a trip to 
Baghdad on January 6, 1955 and talked to the Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Es Said. After 
several conversations between the two leaders, they prepared a declaration on January 
12, 1955 announcing that the two governments would sign a defense agreement. 
Menderes also organized a trip to Syria and Lebanon to convince the leaders of those 
countries to join the alliance that was being formed in the Middle East. However, the 
most important country to convince was Egypt and it was not an easy task. The 
Egyptian Prime Minister, Gamal Abdel, Nasser reacted very severely to the Turkish- 
Iraqi defense agreement and he organized a meeting with the Arab countries on January 
16 to form a joint reaction to the alliance between Turkey and h aq.
The Turkish-Iraqi defense agreement was signed on February 24, 1955. The 
United Kingdom adhered to the agreement on April 4, 1955 and the Baghdad Pact was 
formed officially. In its national intelligence estimate, the United States referred to it as 
the establishment of a regional defense organization in the Middle East. However, in the 
same document, it was argued that Iraq’s decision had roused the opposition of anti-
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Iraqi and anti-U.S. and UK elements and brought to the surface a vast complex of 
intrarégional rivalries and tensions. Moreover, the Turkish-Iraqi Pact increased the 
reactions by Egypt and Israel. Egypt took the pact as a challenge to its dominant role in 
the Arab League councils and as an indication that the US and UK no longer regarded 
Egypt as the key country in the Middle East. Israel, on the other hand, was concerned 
that Turkey, the only Middle Eastern state with which it had enjoyed friendly relations, 
had now entered an agreement with one of its Arab enemies. "^^
Bandung Conference
Another important event in 1955 was the Bandung Conference, held between 18- 
24 April 1955. 29 countries, of which the majority were former European colonies, 
attended to the Conference. The aim of the conference was to determine the policy to be 
followed by the Asian-African countries in the face of the conflict between the Western 
and Soviet blocs. Turkey was one of the participants in the conference and was 
represented by the Foreign Minister Fatin Rüştü Zorlu. The importance of the 
Conference in terms of American-Turkish relations was that Turkey went there upon a 
request by Washington, as revealed later by Menderes, and advocated Western alliance 
with its active participation.
Throughout the conference Zorlu condemned non-alignment and neutrality. He 
stated that the world was divided into two blocs and there shouldn’t be an alternative 
like non-alignment in the face of an expansionist Soviet threat. In a way, Turkey acted 
as the spokesman of the West in the Conference and supported the organizations like 
NATO and the Baghdad Pact, which Turkey said were vital for the existence of the free 
world in the face of Soviet threats. In his memoirs. Zeki Kuneralp, a young diplomat 
who accompanied Zorlu to the Conference, said that:
Turkey did not defend colonialism of our NATO allies at Bandung, but
she did make NATO’s raison d ’etre acceptable. She did indeed condemn
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colonialism and reminded the Conference that she had been among the 
first to revolt again colonialism. But she drew attention to something else 
too. She said, alluding to the nations that had fallen within the Iron 
Curtain, that today a new type of Soviet colonialism had developed 
alongside the classic colonialism and she asked for this to be condemned 
no less strongly. In a roundabout way she had her wish, the final 
communiqué of the Conference condemned every kind of colonialism.
Some non-aligned countries such as India did not welcome the attitude of 
Turkey in the Conference. The Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, whose efforts 
were vital for the gathering of the Conference, advocated a neutral policy, distant both 
from America and Russia^ *^  and reacted to the western oriented arguments of Turkey. 
Although it is statedby Kuneralp that the political stock of both Turkey and Zorlu stood 
very high after the Bandung Conference, later developments showed the opposite.
Going to the Conference, Turkey had lost more than it had gained because some 
of the non-aligned countries saw Turkey as the spokesman of the West and they were 
alienated from Turkey. Turkey would pay for its policy when trying to find a solution to 
the Cyprus problem in the U.N. in 1965, where it was left alone^  ^ by the non-aligned 
countries. Although Turkey’s aim, both in the Conference and throughout the early Cold 
War, was not to alienate the Third World, the side-effect of its Western oriented foreign 
policy was simply the alienation of the Middle East countries and the majority of the 
Third World.^ **
The Failure of the Baghdad Pact
The Baghdad Pact was completed and strengthened further by the adherence of 
Pakistan on July 1, 1955 and of Iran on November 3, 1955. Menderes, on the other 
hand, continued his efforts to convince other Middle Eastern states like Lebanon and 
Jordan to adhere to the Baghdad Pact while states like Egypt and Syria showed their 
determination to remain unattached. By late 1955, it was still the hope of the United 
States and Turkey to expand the Middle East defense using the Baghdad Pact.
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On December 21, 1955 the first Conference of the Baghdad Pact was held in 
Baghdad and the prime ministers of all members gathered to discuss the future efforts of 
the Pact members. The United States joined the Conference as an observer and showed 
the American interest to the Pact. The Ambassador of the United States in Iraq, 
Waldemar J. Gallman, stated that the U.S.’ attendance at the Conference was a proof of 
American interest in the Baghdad Pact and its commitment to the aims of the Pact.^ '^
However, the United States couldn’t fulfill its objectives through the Baghdad 
Pact because the Pact led to a split in the Middle East rather than uniting the Middle 
East states against the Soviet Union. The Middle Eastern states were divided into two 
camps: one represented by the Baghdad Pact countries and the other represented mainly 
by Egypt, which condemned Iraq and Turkey. Israel was not pleased either about the 
new defense system in the Middle East, since it was concerned that the Pact could be 
used against Israel in the future. But one of the major reasons behind the failure of the 
Baghdad Pact was that the United States did not adhere to it as was expected by Turkey.
By the summer of 1955, it was stated by the State Department that it would be 
politically and militarily necessity for the U.S. to adhere, probably within a year at most, 
to a Middle East defense organization.^^ The State Department also said that the best 
procedure was to adhere to the Turk-Iraqi Pact which later became the Baghdad Pact. 
However, Secretary of State Dulles opposed Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson’s 
request that action should be initiated which would facilitate United States adherence to 
the Baghdad Pact at the earliest feasible time^'. Here, it’s crucial to state Dulles’ 
concerns, which didn’t change much in time, and led to disappointment in Turkey 
stemming from the detachment of the U.S. from the Baghdad Pact. Dulles summarized 
those concerns as:
While the original Northern Tier concept envisaged a regional grouping 
to resist Soviet penetration, and the Pact in fact serves this purpose to
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some extent, it has become deeply involved in Arab politics and intrigue.
Until this situation is changed, American adherence would be widely 
interpreted in the Arab world as a move against Arab unity and the action 
would thus seriously undermine our position in several states where we 
are endeavoring to exert useful influence in solving the area’s basic
32problems.
Dulles also stated that U.S. adherence to the Pact would give rise to pressures to extend 
a security guarantee to Israel since it was hard to get ratification from the Congress to 
protect Iraq without protecting Israel. In his letter to Secretary Wilson, Dulles added 
that a situation could develop in the future which would make it “practicable and 
advisable” to join the Pact, but it was not a good idea for the time being. It was 
interesting that the opposition came from Dulles, because the major figure behind the 
creation of the Pact was the Secretary himself
The members of the Baghdad Pact, especially Turkey and Iraq, felt disappointed 
about the U.S. reluctance to adhere to the Pact, and continued to plead for the U.S. 
adherence. Prime Minister Menderes had always thought that the United States would 
one day be a member of the Pact and he did not abandon his hopes till the last moment. 
On every occasion, the Menderes Government expressed its desire and hope for the U.S. 
adherence to the Baghdad Pact thinking that the Soviet threat was ever growing in the 
region. For the Turkish Prime Minister, the United States was an undisputable element 
of power in the Middle East^ "* and the Pact was destined to fail without it.
While Turkey was trying to convince the United States to join the Pact, a very 
important event took place in the Middle East: the Suez Crisis. It was the result of the 
nationalization of the Suez Canal by the Egyptian Prime Minister Nasser on July 26, 
1956 after the U.S. withdrawal from financing the construction of the Aswan High 
Dam. After the nationalization of the Canal,, two conferences were held in London by 
the principal canal-using countries. Turkey was one of the participants in both 
Conferences and it supported the American view that was named the “Dulles Plan.”
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The plan advocated that the Suez Canal be put under international control and by 
supporting this view, Turkey undermined the interests of Egypt and proved its 
commitment once again to the United States. It can be argued that the Menderes 
Government had already given up trying to convince Egypt to join the defense planning 
of the Middle East, because Egypt was determined not to ally with Turkey. It was 
receiving arms from the Soviet Union^  ^ and Egyptian Prime Minister Nasser was 
playing for the leadership in Middle East. Under those circumstances, Turkey acted 
together with its major ally, the United States, while its neighbor Greece rejected 
joining the Conference in order not to alienate Egypt.
More than three months after the nationalization of the Suez Canal, Israel 
attacked Egypt and it was followed by the invasion of the United Kingdom and France. 
Both the United States and Turkey reacted to the invasion and the U.S. put the case 
before the United Nations Security Council and sought to end the fighting. Turkey, on 
the other hand, withdrew its ambassador in Israel to demonstrate its reaction to such an 
invasion, however it couldn’t risk the Israeli-Turkish relations completely.
The Anglo-French intervention transformed the situation, turning it from a local 
Middle Eastern conflict into a Western attack on Egypt and weakened the position of 
France and the U.K. further in the region. The end of the British and French hegemony 
in the region was regarded as a good opportunity by the Menderes Government: Turkey 
could play a leading role in the Middle East in the name of the United States and the 
West. The United States, on the other hand, began to think about adhering to the 
Baghdad Pact and realized that Turkey’s role in the Middle East would be critical in the 
coming days.
Just after the nationalization of the Suez Canal by Egypt, Turkey increased its 
efforts to convince the United States to join the Baghdad Pact. The U.S. Ambassador to
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Turkey sent a letter to the Under Secretary of State Herbert Clark Hoover, Jr. calling for 
help to Turkey in solving its foreign exchange and financial problems. He also said that 
Turkey’s failure to cooperate with the U.S. would be a great loss to the United States in 
terms of men and dollars especially in the light of Nasser’s last maneuver.^* In addition 
to this, the Ambassador thought that prompt and full U.S. adherence to the Baghdad 
Pact would have a tonic effect on the Middle East situation and “stiffen backs of Ai’ab 
countries in firmer posture vis-à-vis Soviets.’’^  ^The Joint Chiefs of Staff also called for 
U.S. adherence to the Baghdad Pact on November 1956 in the light of present and 
foreseeable developments in the Middle East. The JCS argued that under those 
circumstances Israel might accept the U.S. adherence to the Pact at this time would offer 
the greatest opportunity to exert U.S. influence on political and military situations in the 
Middle East with resultant advantage to Israel."^ *’ Thus, Israel was no more a great 
obstacle to the U.S. adherence to the Baghdad Pact.
On 9 November 1956, Menderes went to the NATO meeting in Paris with the 
aim of getting a connection between the Baghdad Pact and NATO. The United States 
was still not in favor of having a connection between the two organizations, but 
declared that “any threat to the territorial integrity or political independence of the states 
of the northern tier (Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Pakistan) would be viewed by the United 
States with the utmost gravity”."*' Although such a decleration was received by Turkey 
with gratification, the real Turkish relief came with the Eisenhower Doctrine.
Birth of the Eisenhower Doctrine
On New Year’s Day, 1957, President Dwight Eisenhower and The Secretary of 
State, J.F. Dulles, met with the leaders of both parties in Congress to ask their support 
for a new declaration of American policy in the Middle East. After the Suez Crisis and 
the Soviet moves to gain influence in the Middle East, President Eisenhower felt that
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the U.S. should make it clear to the Soviets, that they were fully determined to sustain
Western rights in the region."^  ^ On 5 January, he made a speech before the Congress
assembled in a Joint Session and stated that:
Weakness in the present situation and the increased danger from 
International Communism, convince me that basic United States policy 
should now find expression in joint action by the Congress and the 
Executive....The action which I propose would,... first of all, authorize 
the United States to cooperate with and assist any nation or group of 
nations in the general area of the Middle East in the development of 
economic strength dedicated to the maintenance of national 
independence."*^
The resolution was signed into law on 9 March 1957 and Turkey was pleased
more than any nation in the region. In his speech to the Associated Press, Prime
Minister Menderes declared that the Doctrine was an important step towards
establishing political stability in the Middle East and believed that it would bring great
benefit."*"* Ambassador James P. Richards, who was sent to the Middle East by
Eisenhower to explain the Doctrine, came to Turkey as well and talked to Menderes.
They announced a joint declaration declaring that:
The two governments had agreed on working in close cooperation to 
realize the aims of the Eisenhower Docrine and the Turkish Government 
acknowledged the aid that would be given by the United States. Both 
states regard international Communism as a threat to the independence of 
the nations and world peace and security. They decided to act together in 
taking measures against this threat in accord with the UN Treaty."*^
Oral Sander argued that the aim of Turkey in supporting the Doctrine was to attain
a greater commitment by the U.S. to the Middle East and to get more support from
Washington to the Baghdad Pact, at least militarily and economically. Moreover, the
Menderes government aimed to increase the importance of Turkey, before the threat of
Communism, and get more aid fi-om the United States. "*^
By 1957, Turkey was in need of economic aid since the military expenditures
were still a burden on the Turkish economy in spite of American aid. The trade deficit
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and inflation rates were the major economic problems and Washington rejected the 
request by Turkey for $300 million aid from the United States several times. However, 
after the Eisenhower Doctrine, the American economic assistance to Turkey increased 
to some extent and the American-Turkish relations entered into a new phase. For the 
Menderes Government, the Eisenhower Doctrine meant the extension of military and 
economic aid, which began with the Truman Doctrine, to the other Middle East 
countries"^ ,^ and Turkey’s importance would be greater in this new American policy 
towards the Middle East. The fact that the United Kingdom and France would not be a 
part of the new American policy in the region was understood to be to the advantage of 
Turkey, strengthening the American-Turkish alliance.''**
The second important event, which strengthened the American-Turkish relations, 
was the Syrian crisis in which the United States supported Turkey. Along with Egypt 
and Saudi Aiabia, Syria was another country that criticized the policy of Turkey, Iraq 
and the United States in the Middle East, and had good relations with the Soviet Union. 
Neither the United States nor Turkey was happy with the pro-Soviet and anti-Turkish 
attitude of the Syrian Government, and Turkish-Syrian relations deteriorated 
significantly by the beginning of September 1957. In fact, the Turkish-Syrian animosity 
had begun in 1956.
The U.S. Secretary of Defense asserted in November, 1956 that: “the Russians
have been trying recently to develop certain strong-holds in Syria and in this way to
create a dangerous threat against Turkey.”''*' The Secretary of Defense explained the
possible threat that could come from the Syrians as:
the Russians (were) contemplating a long range plan...They may join 
Egypt, and may encircle Turkey from the East, West and the South, so 
that in case of war they would be in a good position to fight against 
Turkey. They would be able to execute a pincers movement through 
Trace and Syria. As long as the Turks are strong and can hold the Turkish 
Straits the Turks do not think that the Soviets can accomplish anything
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this way...The main Soviet intention is to descend into the 
Mediterranean and conduct action against allied lines of communication.
The present action on the part of the Soviets will create a Southern border 
and require consideration by NATO.
By the summer of 1957, Turkish concerns about the developments in Syria 
increased as a result of the success of the left wing party in the elections in Syria. In the 
Turkish newspaper Ulus, a Turkish author expressed that Moscow was trying to make 
Syria its satellite. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, blamed Turkey for preparing for 
a war with Syria and declared that the Soviet Union would not stay calm in case of a 
war between Syria and Turkey. What about the American reaction to this Soviet threat? 
The United States was aware of a Syrian rapprochement with the Soviet Union and the 
tension between Turkey and Syria since late 1956, as we’ve seen in the above 
document, but the American support to Turkey came in September 1957 and it became 
tougher in tone in October 1957 just after the Soviet success of Sputnik, which 
increased the tensions.
By late August 1957, the United States sent the Assistant Secretaiy of State and 
the Middle East .specialist, Loy W. Henderson, to the Middle East to examine the 
situation in the region and give a report to Washington. Henderson stated in his report 
that Syria was receiving aid from the USSR and engaging in propaganda movements to 
have coups in the neighboring Arab states. Thus, the United States began to provide 
economic aid to haq, Jordan and Lebanon by September 5, 1957 in order to prevent the 
adventurous movements of Syria in the Middle East.^' Also, believing that Syria was 
becoming “a base for military and subversive activities in the Middle East” Washington 
informed Turkey that the United States would come to its assistance with armed force in 
case of an attack by the Soviets.
On October 4, 1957 the Soviet Union fired the world’s first satellite, which was 
named “Sputnik”. In Eisenhower’s words, “the Russians could no longer be regarded as
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‘backward’, and had even ‘beaten’ the United States in a spectacular scientific
r  O
competition.·’ After the success of Sputnik, the United States support to Turkey 
increased. On October 8, 1957, a well-known American conespondent, James Reston, 
made an interview with Khrushchev. The Soviet Premier blamed the United States of 
trying to stir up war over Syria and stated that Loy Henderson had been given specific 
instructions to this effect, and having failed to obtain cooperation of the Arab states, the 
United States was now engaged in an effort to get Turkey to launch an attack.^ '* Nikita 
Khrushchev also declared that Turkey could not resist even one day, if war broke out.^^
The following day. Secretary of State Dulles organized a press conference and 
said to Khrushchev that Turkey was an independent nation, capable of creating its own 
foreign policy, which was hardly true for the time being. He warned the Soviet Union 
against aggression and showed the U.S.’ support to Turkey. He stated that “if there 
(was) an attack on Turkey by the Soviet Union, it would not mean a purely defensive 
operation by the United States, with the Soviet Union a privileged sanctuary fi'om which 
to attack Turkey.’’^  ^ With Dulles’ performance, the United States proved its 
commitment to Turkey and all who resisted the Soviet infiltration in the Middle East.
The Syrian crisis calmed by November 1957 and Turkey began to withdraw its 
troops from its southern border. The crisis was completely over in February 1958 after 
Syria and Egypt had formed the United Arab Republic. Both Turkey and the United 
States welcomed the union of the two states since Egypt was not under direct Soviet 
control.^^ By the end of the crisis, the United States did not enter into the Baghdad Pact 
as was hoped by Turkey, but it increased its level of pailicipation in the pact.
The meeting of the Baghdad Pact was organized in Ankara in January 1958 and 
Dulles attended this meeting as an observer. He stated that the members of the Baghdad 
Pact would unquestionably be defended by the United States in case of an attack by the
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Communists and such a commitment by the United States to the Baghdad Pact was 
regarded as a de facto membership to the Pact.^  ^ The American-Turkish relations 
strengthened further after the Syrian crisis and the economic aid to Turkey increased to 
some extent.
The third and perhaps the last important development in the 1950s, in terms of 
American-Turkish relations, was the coup in Iraq, which was followed by the American 
intervention in Lebanon on 15 July 1958, and the Turkish-American Bilateral 
Agreement on 5 March 1959. The military coup in Iraq happened on 14 July 1958 and 
coincided with the meeting of the Baghdad Pact in Ankara. The Baghdad Pact members 
were waiting for the Iraqi delegation, which was late and were shocked with the news of 
a coup in Iraq in the morning. It was the beginning of another troublesome period in the 
Middle East. Both the Iraqi King and the Prime Minister were killed during the coup in 
Iraq, and the Pact members condemned the uprising. Turkey, as well as the United 
States felt anxious about the developments in the Middle East and the future of the Pact.
Just after news of the coup had reached Ankara, the Pact members had a 
meeting. Prime Minister Menderes said that they should take some measures against the 
revolutionai-ies who were under the leadership of General Abdulkerim Kasim. 
However, Iran and Pakistan were against inteiwening in the developments in Iraq. 
Therefore Menderes declared that Turkey itself would take the necessary steps. He 
wanted to send forces to the Iraqi border as soon as possible, in spite of the warning by 
President Bayar and Foreign Minister Zorlu. However, the NATO allies considered the 
issue and prevented Menderes from going further. '^  ^Essentially, after the coup m Iraq, 
the new government in Baghdad declared that it would continue its cooperation with the
West.
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The Iraqi revolution marked the first disagreement between the Menderes 
Government and the opposition party on foreign policy: the Government believed that 
the revolutionaries aimed to damage the Baghdad Pact which was an element of peace 
and stability in the Middle East. However, the major opposition party believed that the 
coup was a result of the oppressive I’egime in Iraq. Whatever, the reasons of the Iraqi 
revolution, the attitude of the Turkish Government changed when the new regime was 
strengthened, and Turkey recognized the Iraqi Government on 31 July
The final significant development of the decade was the American intervention 
in Lebanon on 15 July 1958. On 15 July, it was declared by President Eisenhower that 
the United States had intervened in Lebanon as a response to the request by the 
Lebanese leader Camille Chamoun, who was afraid of a revolutionai'y coup in Lebanon. 
Turkish government supported the U.S.’ intervention in Lebanon and allowed the 
American troops to utilize the Incirlik air base in Adana, despite popular criticisms in 
Turkey.
The major criticism about the use of Incirlik air base came from the opposition 
party, the RPP, and the press. The fir st criticism of the RPP was that the troops were 
sent under the authorization of the United States rather than Turkey, which was a 
violation of Turkish sovereignty rights. Second, the opposition party said that the 
United States used the air base beyond the limits of NATO cooperation and for its own 
purposes. The criticism of the Turkish press, on the other hand, was that Turkish 
journalists couldn’t enter into the air base since it was a U-2 base and there were strict 
security controls. However the European journalists could enter into the base together 
with the troops from Europe*’'.
Although supported by the Menderes Government in 1958, the U.S. intervention 
in Lebanon was recalled with regret in Turkish foreign policy circles once Turkey
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moved toward a more pro-Arab orientation in the 1960s.^  ^ Another issue that was 
criticized by the RPP was the bilateral agreement between Turkey and the United States. 
After the Iraqi coup, Washington made a policy review and decided to strengthen its ties 
with the remaining members of the Baghdad Pact because the significance of the 
northern tier increased. The result of this policy review by Washington was to sign 
bilateral agreements with Turkey, Iran and Pakistan, and the Turkish-American Bilateral 
Agreement was signed on 5 March 1959, and the Turkish Grand National Assembly 
ratified the Agreement on 9 May 1960. A very important period of American-Turkish 
relations ended with the coup d’etat in Turkey on 27 May 1960.
The period between 1953 and 1960, which began with great expectations 
especially by Turkey, wasn’t very satisfying and pleasing in terms of American-Turkish 
relations due to American hesitancy to solidly involve in the Middle Eastern affairs 
throughout the 1950s and its unilateral attitude in Lebanese intervention. Hence, the 
period between 1953 and 1960 was not an exception of the “gilded age’’ of American- 
Turkish relations and witnessed some crucial disagreements between the two countries, 
which would form the basis of later problems.
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CONCLUSION
One of the most crucial alliances of the post-WWU era, which survived after the 
Cold War as well, was the American-Turkish alliance. The American-Turkish alliance 
between 1945 and 1960 is very important, since the roots of the alliance between the 
two countries are located in that particular period. The general tendency is to refer to the 
period as the “golden age” of American-Turkish relations because, on the surface, it was 
less problematic compared to the period after. However, it was a period full of 
disagreements and problems, which formed the basis of greater problems in 1960s and 
1970s, and it’s more appropriate to characterize it as the “gilded age” American-Turkish 
relations.
The reasons for the first rapprochement between Turkey and the United States in 
the post-war period were about the Turkish Straits, on which the Soviet Union requested 
bases and the United States had security and economic interests, as well as Turkey’s 
need tor Western support in the face of the Soviet threat and its own economic 
difficulties. The Soviet Union was pressing the Turkish government to have bases on 
the Straits and it claimed rights over East Anatolian territory. Thus, Turkey felt 
extremely anxious about their security and sought American support to resist those 
Soviet claims since the United States was the only power that had the capability to do so 
in the post-war environment. However, it had to wait until Washington was assured of 
Soviet expansionism as a result of some developments in East Mediterranean and the 
Middle East such as the civil war in Greece, the Iran Crisis and Communist takeovers in 
Eastern Europe. On 12 March 1947, the Truman Doctrine was announced and it was 
followed by the Marshall Plan. The Turkish government interpreted this. Although both
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were interpreted as the American commitment to Turkey by the Turkish government, it 
wouldn’t be possible to erase the Turkish memory of the lack of American interest to 
Turkish interests before 1945.
After the Truman Doctrine, the United States gave Turkey a high priority in its 
defense planning regarding the Middle East due to its geographic location and its 
willingness to be a part of the Western world. Turkey, on the other hand, regarded the 
United States as its major ally and tied its foreign policy to the United States. The 
creation of NATO in 1949 was an important development in the Cold War. Turkey had 
the desire to be part of this organization from the very beginning, but it had to wait for 
three years, which witnessed one of the most problematic years of American-Turkish 
relations between 1945 and 1960.
The Korean War was a turning point in the Cold War and the American-Turkish 
relations. The Menderes government didn’t hesitate to send a significant number of 
troops to Korea, which showed great heroism throughout the war, and increased the 
advocates of Turkey’s entry into NATO in the United States. After the Korean War, 
Turkey increased its efforts to be part of the Pact, but it was not easy to convince 
Washington, which was, regarded as the major decision making body of NATO by 
Turkey. The United States, although opposed Turkey’s entry into NATO due to the 
“limited geographic area” thesis at first, accepted the Turkish application as a result of 
the U.S.’ changing foreign policy understanding, fear of Turkish neutrality, and the 
impressive Turkish contribution to the Korean War. Although Turkey was finally 
accepted into NATO, the American-Turkish relations weakened to some extent while 
Turkey was trying to convince its major ally.
After Turkey’s entry into NATO in February 1952, which was a very significant 
development showing that Turkey was part of the Western defense; the relations
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between the two countries were not very harmonious as expected by the Turkish 
government and the public. Between 1953 and 1960, Turkey participated in regional 
alliances, which were supported by the U.S. First, it cooperated with Greece and 
Yugoslavia under the Balkan Pact and then with Pakistan, Iraq and Iran under the 
Baghdad Pact. The Eisenhower Administration gave priority to the Middle East in its 
foreign policy and regarded Turkey as the key element in the “northern tier”. Turkey 
accepted this role with happiness since it would strengthen the ties between the two 
countries, help Turkey to resist the Soviet threat, and increase the economic and military 
aid to Turkey. However, the unwillingness of the U.S. to actively participate in the 
Middle East defense created some problems in American-Turkish relations. Washington 
preferred not to be a member of the Pact in order not to alienate Israel and other Middle 
East countries that were against the Pact. Turkey was disappointed with the American 
reluctance to be a solid part of the defense organization since Baghdad Pact was 
encouraged by the United States and would be useless without it.
On the other hand, Turkey was pleased with the announcement of the 
Eisenhower Doctrine in early 1957 and the U.S. support to Turkey against the perceived 
Syrian threat in late 1957. The tensions in the Middle East increased following the coup 
in Iraq and the later American intervention in Lebanon, which was supported by Turkey 
allowing the American troops to use the Incirlik airbase. Later, the use of Incirlik by the 
Americans during the Lebanese intervention was criticized more, when the American- 
Turkish relations deteriorated a lot in 1960s and 1970s. Turkey would argue that the 
major beneficiary of the American-Turkish alliance had always been the United States. 
The United States and Turkey signed a Bilateral Agreement on March 1959 and the 
relations between the two allies continued to be more or less stable till the end of the
1950s.
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Between 1945 and 1960, the two countries knew and understood each other 
better compared to the period before 1945, and their alliance was less problematic 
compared to the period after 1960. However, since Turkey tied its foreign policy to the 
United States and regarded it as more than an ally, and perhaps as a “friend”', 
throughout the 1950s, the disagreements and problems, arising from the differences in 
their interests, concerns and perceptions of one another, made Turkey to feel as it was 
betrayed by its friend from time to time between 1945 and 1960. While they were close 
allies and friends on the surface, serious disagreements were never absent from their 
alliance and they formed the basis of later problems. Thus, we have to search for the 
roots of the problems between the two countries, which became more visible in the 
1960s and 1970s, in the period between 1945 and 1950, which could only be 
characterized as the “gilded age” of American-Turkish relations. More detailed archival 
studies, using NARA and Turkish Government archives; and an additional emphasis on 
the Cyprus issue can contribute further to the history of American-Turkish alliance not 
only in 1950s but also 1960s and 1970s.
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Recommendation for assistance 
to Greece and Turkey
by the Presisent of the United States,
Harry Truman
The gravity of the situation which confronts the world today necessitates 
my appearance before a joint session of the Congress. The foreign policy 
and the national security of this country are involved.
One aspect of the present situation, which I wish to present to you 
at this time for your consideration and decision, concerns Greece 
and Turkey.
The United States has received from the Greek Government an 
urgent appeal for financial and economic assistance. Preliminary 
reports from the American Economic Mission now in Greece and 
reports from the American Ambassador in Greece corroborate the 
statement of the Greek Government that assistance is imperative 
if Greece is to survive as a free nation.
I do not believe that the American people and the Congress wish 
to turn a deaf ear to the appeal of the Greek Government.
Greece is not a rich country. Lack of sufficient natural resources 
has always forced the Greek people to work hard to make both 
ends meet. Since 1940, this industrious and peace-loving country 
has suffered invasion, four years of cruel enemy occupation, and 
bitter internal strife.
When forces of liberation entered Greece they found that the 
retreating Germans had destroyed virtually all the railways, roads, 
port facilities, communications and merchant marine. More than a 
thousand villages had been burned. Eighty-five per cent of the 
children were tubercular. Livestock, poultry and draft animals had 
almost disappeared. Inflation had wiped out practically all savings. 
As a result of these tragic conditions, a military minority, exploiting
human want and misery, was able to create political chaos which.
until now, has made economic recovery impossible.
Greece is today without funds to finance the importation of those 
goods which are essential to bare subsistence. Under these 
circumstances the people of Greece cannot make progress in 
solving their problems of reconstruction. Greece is in desperate 
need of financial and economic assistance to enable it to resume 
purchases of food, clothing, fuel and seeds. These are 
indispensable for the subsistence of its people and are obtainable 
only from abroad. Greece must have help to import the goods 
necessary to restore internal order and security so essential for 
economic and political recovery.
The Greek Government has also asked for the assistance of 
experienced American administrators, economists and technicians 
to insure that the financial and other aid given to Greece shall be 
used effectively in creating a stable and self-sustaining economy 
and in improving its public administration.
The very existence of the Greek state is today threatened by the 
terrorist activities of several thousand armed men, led by 
Communists, who defy the Government's authority at a number of 
points, particularly along the northern boundaries. A commission 
appointed by the United Nations Security Council is at present 
investigating disturbed conditions in northern Greece and alleged 
border violations along the frontier between Greece on the one 
hand and Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia on the other. 
Meanwhile, the Greek Government is unable to cope with the 
situation. The Greek Army is small and poorly equipped. It needs 
supplies and equipment if it is to restore the authority of the 
Government throughout Greek territory.
Greece must have assistance if it is to become a self-supporting 
and self-respecting democracy.
The United States must supply that assistance. We have already 
extended to Greece certain types of relief and economic aid but 
these are inadequate. There is no other country to which 
democratic Greece can turn.
No other nation is willing and able to provide the necessary 
support for a democratic Greek Government.
The British Government, which has been helping Greece, can 
give no further financial or economic aid after March. Great Britain 
finds itself under the necessity of reducing or liquidating its 
commitments in several parts of the world, including Greece.
We have considered how the United Nations might assist in this 
crisis. But the situation is an urgent one requiring immediate 
action, and the United Nations and its related organizations are 
not in a position to extend help of the kind that is required.
It is important to note that the Greek Government has asked for 
our aid in utilizing effectively the financial and other assistance we 
may give to Greece, and in improving public administration. It is of 
the utmost importance that we supervise the use of any funds 
made available to Greece, in such a manner that each dollar 
spent will count toward making Greece self-supporting, and will 
help to build an economy in which a healthy democracy can 
flourish.
No government is perfect. One of the chief virtues of a 
democracy, however, is that its defects are always visible and 
under democratic processes can be pointed out and corrected. 
The Government of Greece is not perfect. Nevertheless it 
represents 85 per cent of the members of the Greek parliament 
who were chosen in an election last year. Foreign observers, 
including 692 Americans, considered this election to be a fair 
expression of the views of the Greek people.
The Greek Government has been operating in an atmosphere of 
chaos and extremism. It has made mistakes. The extension of aid 
by this country does not mean that the United States condones 
everything that the Greek Government has done or will do. We 
have condemned in the past, and we condemn now, extremist 
measures of the Right or the Left. We have in the past advised 
tolerance, and we advise tolerance now.
Greece's neighbor, Turkey, also deserves our attention.
The future of Turkey as an independent and economically sound 
State is clearly no less important to the freedom-loving peoples of 
the world than the future of Greece. The circumstances in which 
Turkey finds itself today are considerably different from those of 
Greece. Turkey has been spared the disasters that have beset 
Greece. And during the war, the United States and Great Britain 
furnished Turkey with material aid.
Nevertheless, Turkey now needs our support.
Since the war Turkey has sought financial assistance from Great 
Britain and the United States for the purpose of effecting that 
modernization necessary for the maintenance of its national 
integrity.
That integrity is essential to the preservation of order in the Middle 
East.
The British Government has informed us that, owing to its own 
difficulties, it can no longer extend financial or economic aid to 
Turkey.
As in the case of Greece, if Turkey is to have the assistance it 
needs, the United States must supply it. We are the only country 
able to provide that help.
I am fully aware of the broad implications involved if the United 
States extends assistance to Greece and Turkey, and I shall
discuss these implications with you at this time.
One of the primary objectives of the foreign policy of the United 
States is the creation of conditions in which we and other nations 
will be able to work out a way of life free from coercion. This was a 
fundamental issue in the war with Germany and Japan. Our 
victory was won over countries which sought to impose their will, 
and their way of life, upon other nations.
To ensure the peaceful development of nations, free from 
coercion, the United States has taken a leading part in 
establishing the United Nations. The United Nations is designed to 
make possible lasting freedom and independence for all its 
members. We shall not realize our objectives, however, unless we 
are willing to help free people to maintain their free institutions and 
their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to 
impose upon them totalitarian regimes.
This is no more than a frank recognition that totalitarian regimes 
imposed on free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, 
undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the 
security of the United States.
The peoples of a number of countries of the world have recently 
had totalitarian regimes forced upon them against their will. The 
Government of the United States has made frequent protests 
against coercion and intimidation in violation of the Yalta 
agreement, in Poland, Rumania, and Bulgaria. I must also state 
that in a number of other countries there have been similar 
developments.
At the present moment in world history nearly every nation must 
choose between alternative ways of life. The choice is too often 
not a free one.
One way of life is based upon the will of the majority, and is
distinguished by free institutions, representative government, free 
elections, guaranties of individual liberty, freedom of speech and 
religion, and freedom from political oppression.
The second way of life is based upon the will of a minority forcibly 
imposed upon the majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a 
controlled press and radio, fixed elections, and the suppression of 
personal freedoms.
I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support 
free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed 
minorities or by outside pressures. I believe that we must assist 
free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way. I 
believe that our help should be primarily through economic and 
financial aid which is essential to economic stability and orderly 
political processes.
The world is not static, and the status quo is not sacred. But we 
cannot allow changes in the status quo in violation of the Charter 
of the United Nations by such methods as coercion, or by such 
subterfuges as political infiltration. In helping free and independent 
nations to maintain their freedom, the United States will be giving 
effect to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.
It is necessary only to glance at a map to realize that the survival 
and integrity of the Greek nation are of grave importance in a 
much wider situation. If Greece should fall under the control of an 
armed minority, the effect upon its neighbor, Turkey, would be 
immediate and serious. Confusion and disorder might well spread 
throughout the entire Middle East.
Moreover, the disappearance of Greece as an independent State 
would have a profound effect upon those countries in Europe 
whose peoples are struggling against great difficulties to maintain 
their freedoms and their independence while they repair the
damages of war. It would be an unspeakable tragedy if these 
countries, which have struggled so long against overwhelming 
odds, should lose that victory for which they sacrificed so much. 
Collapse of free institutions and loss of independence would be 
disastrous not only for them but for the world.
Discouragement and possibly failure would quickly be the lot of 
neighboring peoples striving to maintain their freedom and 
independence.
Should we fail to aid Greece and Turkey in this fateful hour, the 
effect will be far-reaching to the West as well as to the East. We 
must take immediate and resolute action.
I therefore ask the Congress to provide authority for assistance to 
Greece and Turkey in the amount of $400,000,000 for the period 
ending June 30, 1948. In requesting these funds, I have taken into 
consideration the maximum amount of relief assistance which 
would be furnished to Greece out of the $350,000,000 which I 
recently requested that the Congress authorize for the prevention 
of starvation and suffering in countries devastated by the war.
In addition to funds, I ask the Congress to authorize the detail of 
American civilian and military personnel to Greece and Turkey, at 
the request of those countries, to assist in the tasks of 
reconstruction, and for the purpose of supervising the use of such 
financial and material assistance as may be furnished. I 
recommend that authority also be provided for the instruction and 
training of selected Greek and Turkish personnel.
Finally, I ask that the Congress provide authority which will permit 
the speediest and most effective use, in terms of needed 
commodities, supplies and equipment, of such funds as may be 
authorized.
If further funds, or further authority, should be needed for
purposes indicated in this message, I shall not hesitate to bring 
the situation before the Congress. On this subject the executive 
and legislative branches of the Government must work together. 
This is a serious course upon which we embark. I would not 
recommend it except that the alternative is much more serious. 
The United States contributed $341,000,000,000 toward winning 
world war II. This is an investment in world freedom and world 
peace. The assistance that I am recommending for Greece and 
Turkey amounts to little more than one-tenth of 1 per cent of this 
investment. It is only common sense that we should safeguard 
this investment and make sure that it was not in vain.
The seeds of totalitarian regimes are nurtured by misery and 
want. They spread and grow in the evil soil of poverty and strife. 
They reach their full growth when the hope of a people for a better 
life has died. We must keep that hope alive.
The free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining 
their freedoms. If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger 
the peace of the world and we shall surely endanger the welfare 
of our own nation.
Great responsibilities have been placed upon us by the swift 
movement of events. I am confident that the Congress will face 
these responsibilities squarely.
Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of Greece and
Turkey
The Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, signed at Washington on April 4, 1949 Being 
satisfied that the security o f the North Atlantic area will be enhanced by the accession of the 
Kingdom of Greece and the Republic o f Turkey to that Treaty, agree as follows:
Article 1
Upon the entry into force of this Protocol, the Government of 
the United States of America shall, on behalf of all the Parties, 
communicate to the Government of the Kingdom of Greece and 
the Government of the Republic of Turkey an invitation to 
accede to the North Atlantic Treaty, as it may be modified by 
Article 2 of the present Protocol. Thereafter the Kingdom of 
Greece and the Republic of Turkey shall each become a Party 
on the date when it deposits its instruments of accession with 
the Government of the United States of America in accordance 
with Article lO of the Treaty.
Article 2
If the Republic of Turkey becomes a Party to the North Atlantic 
Treaty, Article 6 of the Treaty shall, as from the date of the 
deposit by the Government of the Republic of Turkey of its 
instruments of accession with the Government of the United 
States of America, be modified to read as follows:
For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or 
more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack:
1. on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North 
America, on the Algerian Departments of France, on the 
territory of Turkey or on the islands under the 
jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic 
area north of the Tropic of Cancer;
2. on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, 
when in or over these territories or any other area in 
Europe in whicH occupation forces of any of the Parties 
were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into 
force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic 
area north of the Tropic of Cancer.
Article 3
The present Protocol shall enter into force when each of the 
Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty has notified the Government 
of the United States of America of its acceptance thereof. The 
Government of the United States of America shall inform all the 
Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty of the date of the receipt of 
each such notification and of the date of the entry into force of 
the present Protocol.
Article 4
The present Protocol, of which the English and French texts are 
equally authentic, shall be deposited in the Archives of the 
Government of the United States of America. Duly certified 
copies thereof shall be transmitted by that Government to the 
Governments of all the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty.
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